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INTRODUCTION 
This research began with what seemed like a simple question – is democracy, as measured by the ability of 
civil society organisations to have a voice in political debate flourishing or languishing in New Zealand? The 
question arose because there had been a number of cases in the media that rang alarm bells with regard to 
the attitude of successive governments to public debate (the foundation of a healthy democracy). Research 
projects with the community and voluntary sector1 seemed to indicate that the „independence‟ of the sector 
from the state was being eroded so thoroughly that organisations were struggling to critique the nation‟s 
political leaders and their policies. 
The release of a report by the Australia Institute, „Silencing Dissent‟, further spurred interest in the issue of how 
the community and voluntary sector in New Zealand was faring with regard to exercising its voice in political 
decision-making. The Australia Institute report asserted that during the Howard government years‟ democracy 
was undermined, particularly as it related to the involvement of community and voluntary organisations in 
political decision-making. Many of the fears expressed by Australian community and voluntary organisations 
resonated with the anecdotal evidence here in New Zealand. For example in the conclusion to „Silencing 
Dissent‟ it is noted that: 
The survey results presented in this report depict widespread alarm among NGOs about their lack of 
ability to speak in support of those they represent without risking revenge in the form of personal 
abuse from Government representatives, public disparagement and withdrawal of funding. Nine out 
of ten NGOs surveyed do not believe that individuals and organisations that dissent from current 
government views are valued by the Government as part of a robust democracy. And nine out of ten 
believe that dissenting organisations risk having their funding cut (Maddison, Denniss & Hamilton., 
2004, p.43). 
Maddison et al. (2004, p.viii) argued that “democracy has been undermined by the concurrent rise in neo-
liberal ideas and „public choice theory‟ which sees NGOs as „selfish and self-serving‟ interest groups with little 
representative legitimacy”. While this trend may have begun under the Australian Labor government of the 
1990s, “it was with the election of the Howard Government in 1996 that this view came to dominate policy 
making processes” (Maddison et al. 2004, p.vii). 
Many of the issues raised in the Australian survey echoed concerns found in New Zealand in the 1990s about 
the spaces for democratic engagement by our community and voluntary sector. Cull (1993, p.18) in her 
research on the effects of the funding regime on the voluntary sector in Palmerston North, drew on American 
and British concerns to describe the issues facing the sector in New Zealand: 
When the funder calls the tune decisions are made by the funder about the legitimacy of the cause. 
Therefore, one of the issues facing voluntary organisations is that of “politicised” funding – their 
budgets are “generated by a political process” (Edwards & Gummer, 1988, p2). Two factors which 
contribute to this politicised funding are identified by Edwards & Gummer, as firstly, disputes over 
goals and, secondly, problems with measurement of effectiveness. 
Similarly Saville-Smith and Bray noted in a review of government funding within the community and voluntary 
sector (1994, p.23) that: 
                                               
1 During this project, conversations with respondents indicated a clear preference for use of the „community and voluntary sector‟ as opposed 
to terms like non-government sector, non-profit sector, or third sector found in a range of academic literature and government documents. As 
a result we have where possible used community and voluntary sector as the descriptor for the sector. 
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[Contracting is] likely to result in the development of a new „professional‟ class of managers in non-
profit agencies… [This] may be associated with changes in agency values, organisational structures 
and processes. … the reorientation of the non-profit sector from advocacy to Government purchased 
service provision could potentially undermind [sic] one of the platforms for democratic participation in 
policy development. 
While there were some indications from New Zealand research that the community and voluntary sector had 
limited capacity to exercise democratic voice on behalf of marginalised communities, there had not been a 
systematic investigation of their engagement in political debate. With the permission of the Australia Institute 
research team, we remodeled their survey instrument and set about canvassing the views of community and 
voluntary sector organisations about their involvement in political decision-making, democracy, and political 
advocacy. While in Australia the survey covered a decade under a single government – it looked at „the 
Howard years‟ – the timing of the New Zealand survey resulted in the purposeful collection of views from the 
sector about these issues during the Labour-led coalitions from 1999 to 2008; and then under the National-
led coalitions for part of 2008 and into 2009. 
This report sets responses from 153 organisations in the context of existing New Zealand research in order to 
examine the dynamic interactions of the state and the community and voluntary sector. We begin by 
providing justification for the sector‟s involvement in democratic debate before moving on to present an 
historical overview of the relationship between the state and community and voluntary sector organisations. It 
is clear that a major shift in the nature of the state – from the male, wage-earner welfare state to a neo-
liberal, free-market state – underpins current attitudes toward the involvement of community and voluntary 
sector organisations in political debate and decision-making. The approaches to democratic debate which 
begin in the mid-1980s are shown to continue through the „Third Way‟ governance period of the Labour-led 
coalitions from 1999 to 2008. 
Section Two sets out how we selected our sample for the survey mail-out; who we received responses from; 
and, how the results were analysed, before moving on in Section Three to examine responses to the survey. 
While New Zealand‟s community and voluntary sector organisations have in the past been a strong and 
necessary voice for the most marginalised of our society, since the 1980s their place in democratic 
conversations has come under challenge, almost to the point where for some groups the only option is to 
remain silent. Responses to our survey demonstrate that the community and voluntary sector in New Zealand is 
not simply silenced by disapproving governments, they have been constrained by the very mode of 
governance that has come to dominate in the early part of the 21st century. The silencing is achieved by 
disciplining the sector through state funded contracts which encompass strong managerial requirements for 
accountability, auditing, measuring, and evaluating outputs. The move from a welfare state to a neo-liberal 
contract state2 constrained the conditions that underpin a healthy relationship between the state and the 
community and voluntary sector. There is a lack of trust between these two sectors; reduced space for 
experimentation in programme delivery or innovation as new „social issues‟ arose; and, there was little in the 
way of a longer term vision for those areas of policy response in which the community and voluntary sector 
was seen to be responsible (outcomes needed to be achieved with one-off projects in short time frames). The 
result is a community and voluntary sector that almost continually must check itself to ensure that it does not 
„bite the hand that feeds it‟. 
 
                                               
2 In line with Peck et al. (2012) and Larner (2003 and 2005), we acknowledge that neo-liberalism is not a coherent or singular project. Our 
engagement in this debate is in particular about the process and ideology which sees the state creating a contact environment for service 
delivery, hence our adoption of the term „neo-liberal contract state‟. 
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1.1  The role of community and voluntary organisations in democracy  
Non-government organisations (NGOs) serve as essential intermediaries between community and 
government, conveying important information about the needs and preferences of a wide range of 
groups in the community to government that would otherwise remain remote and uninformed. … NGOs 
provide a voice for marginalised groups and means and opportunities to make claims on government 
between elections. (Maddison et al. 2004, p.vii) 
Often because they are working at the grass-roots or flax roots level, NGOs will become aware of 
trends and emerging issues earlier than the government. In short, it is difficult to argue that such groups 
are not essential in any modern state (Salter 2004, p.9) 
The acknowledgement of a place for community and voluntary sector organisations within a democracy 
centres on an acceptance that citizen participation in democracy constitutes more than voting in elections every 
three years. Underpinning this belief are the core democratic principles of popular control and political 
equality. As noted by Beetham (1994, p.28): 
Democracy is a political concept, concerning the collectively binding decisions about the rules and 
policies of a group, association or society. It claims that such decision-making should be, and it is 
realised to the extent that such decision-making actually is, subject to the control of all members of the 
collectivity considered as equals. That is to say, democracy embraces the related principles of popular 
control and political equality. [emphasis in original] 
The Democratic Audit,3 which has been used to evaluate the health of democracy in a range of countries 
including Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Henderson and Bellamy, 2002), was developed from 
the first principles above. It includes a range of questions around „open and accountable government‟ which 
can be used to „audit‟ the extent of democracy in a nation. Two questions in particular pertain specifically to 
the role of citizen control of legislatures: 
6. How systematic and open to public scrutiny are the procedures for government consultation of 
public opinion and of relevant interests in the formation and implementation of policy and legislation? 
7. How accessible are elected politicians to approach by their electors, and how effectively do they 
represent constituents‟ interests? (Beetham 1994, p.37) 
While Beetham‟s work in 1994 does not directly stipulate the role of the community and voluntary sector 
within the Democratic Audit, the assertion that there must be space for „relevant interests‟ to influence policy 
and legislation can be argued as recognising a range of citizen-initiated organisations and spaces. In many 
cases groups from the community and voluntary sector are the „relevant interests‟ for policy issues due to their 
close relationships with constituencies and communities.  
The development of the Democratic Audit has seen more explicit questions added around civil society and 
participation: 
  
                                               
3 
The Democratic Audit is a tool developed by David Beetham and colleagues and was “first developed the framework for use in the UK. But 
we re-designed and expanded it for the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Stockholm, to create a 
universal framework to assess the condition of democracy in any country in the world” (The Democratic Audit of the United Kingdom, 2011). 
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. . . How extensive is the range of voluntary associations, citizen groups, social movements, etc., and 
how independent are they from government? 
Relevant data 
1 Laws: examine regulations governing the registration, governance, financing and membership of 
voluntary associations, NGOs, self-management organisations. 
2 Positive indicators: investigate data on the range and distribution of voluntary associations, their 
fields of activity, public impact, etc. 
3 Negative indicators: investigate incidence of subordination to government or governing parties, to 
foreign agencies or interests; the proportion of income not deriving from members‟ contributions. 
(The Democratic Audit of the United Kingdom: Framework for Democracy Assessment, Block 3: Civil 
Society and Popular Participation, 2011) 
And in both Australia and Canada, democratic audits have included examination of the role of the community 
and voluntary sector in democracy (see Sawer 2012; Staples 2006; and, Young and Everett, 2003). 
If the foundation of a healthy democracy is „independent citizen groups‟ who can scrutinise government 
legislation and make representation to politicians, how accepted is this role for the community and voluntary 
sector in New Zealand?  
Much of the analysis of citizen lobbying or collective advocacy work in New Zealand centres on „interest 
groups‟ which have had a significant role in the formation of New Zealand state, society, and economy. For 
example, Clements (1982, p.161), in discussing „Political Parties and Organisational Interest Groups‟ referred 
to Federated Farmers (1945), the Manufacturers Association (Federation 1897), the Employers Federation 
(1902), the Chamber of Commerce (1856) and the Federation of Labour (1937) as the „New Zealand 
pressure group system‟ all of which in their turn had significant influence on political parties. Interest groups 
including the churches have existed from the 1840s as Clements (1982, p.145) notes constituting “… pressure 
from below that resulted in universal suffrage” and “...the modern mass-based political parties in New 
Zealand.” They have also been instrumental in increasing consciousness and subsequent changes in policy for 
such concerns as destitution, the struggle for the eight-hour day, temperance, and poverty. The role of interest 
groups in policy making in New Zealand is noted by Tenbensel (2006, p.526) who states: “…the purpose of 
interest groups is to influence policy. This does not mean that influencing policy is a group‟s sole or even 
primary purpose just that it may seek to do so under particular circumstances”. Likewise, Saville-Smith and 
Bray (1994, p.10) note the “...non-profit welfare sector in New Zealand has always played an important role 
in political discourse and in the delivery of social and health services”. 
Frequently the state is presented as the neutral arbiter of the competing demands of „interest groups‟ in part 
due to the dominance of pluralism as the theory of state in New Zealand. Shirley (1982, p.239) maintained 
that in the New Zealand context: “The ideologies and values of policy makers and the underlying assumptions 
which condition the theory and practice of planning are ignored ... these deficiencies emanate from a society 
which is economically dependent upon international capitalism, socially dependent upon functionalist theories 
of the State and politically dependent upon pluralist models of planning” (Shirley, 1982, p.239). Certainly 
pluralism is evident in the analysis and theorising of political scientists in New Zealand (Mulgan, 2004). Such 
theorising presents a relatively narrow approach to democracy and the intersection of the state and 
community and voluntary sector. 
In this report we take a more extensive view of democracy that is built on „collective action‟ models 
exemplified in participatory and radical democracy traditions, and which sees a role for an „active‟ state in 
democracy. This perspective is expressed by Fung and Wright (2001, p.5): 
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„Democracy‟ as a way of organizing the state has come to be narrowly identified with territorially 
based competitive elections of political leadership for legislative and executive offices. Yet, 
increasingly, this mechanism of political representation seems ineffective in accomplishing the central 
ideals of democratic politics: facilitating active political involvement of the citizenry, forging political 
consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that ground a productive 
economy and healthy society, and, in more radical egalitarian versions of the democratic ideal, 
ensuring that all citizens benefit from the nation‟s wealth. 
So does the New Zealand state accept that community and voluntary sector organizations have a role to play 
in democratic debate? 
1.2  A democratic role recognised by the state  
The role of community groups, interest groups and social movements in democracy and policy formation has 
been acknowledged by the New Zealand state in law since the mid-19th century (see Tennant, O‟Brien & 
Sanders, 2008; Jesson, 1992; Eichbaum & Shaw 2006; Mulgan, 2004). And the importance of the community 
and voluntary sector is still acknowledged within state publications today, though views on the role of the 
sector vary from those in which they are seen as partners, to those which present the sector as a vehicle for 
service delivery. For example, in 2001 the Ministry of Social Develop (n.p.) noted that: 
Government values the contribution of community, voluntary and iwi/Maori organisations to good 
policy making and delivery of effective services. Government agencies and the community sector will 
work together to develop and improve consultation processes through sharing good practice, 
guidelines, workshops and training. 
What is recognised is the government‟s changed perception of the sector from independence “...to a vehicle 
for the delivery and implementation of state policy” (Munford and Sander 1999, p.49). Wilson (2001, p.6) 
noted that since the 1980s “The voluntary social service sector can be seen as a key stakeholder in the New 
Zealand Government‟s efforts to mobilise communities and to further encourage community responsibility and 
participation.” 
Similarly the Cabinet Manual, a document governing the pinnacle of New Zealand policy making, recognises 
a place for interest groups: 
It may be appropriate to consult outside interest groups when developing policy. This should be 
discussed with the Minister's office beforehand. In some circumstances, this consultation may be more 
appropriate after the policy has been considered by Cabinet. 
Some Acts prescribe the consultation a Minister must undertake before making certain statutory 
decisions. The Minister and department should ensure that in such cases, adequate consultation has 
taken place in accordance with the Act. (Cabinet Office, 2011, para.6) 
The importance of the community and voluntary sector in answering complex social problems was reflected in 
the government‟s decision in 2000 to create a portfolio for the community and volunteer sector and its 
subsequent 2003 decision to establish the Office for the Community and Voluntary Sector (OCVS) within the 
Ministry of Social Development (MSD). This office exists to „strengthen‟ government‟s relationship with the 
sector and “...to address cross-agency issues which affect the sector in dealing with government” (OCVS 2008, 
p.22). 
Despite the recognition of the importance of the community and voluntary sector in answering complex social 
problems, developments within the state have been used to separate the servicing and „advocacy‟ roles 
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carried out by the sector. This separation can be seen in the way the sector is „officially‟ defined and the 
struggle to capture both the structure and functions of organisations within those definitions. 
Capturing the „structure‟ of the sector is perhaps more easily handled. Academic definitions provided by 
Sanders, O‟Brien, Tennant, Sokolowski and Salaman (2008, p.5) require that community and voluntary 
organisations “...be organised, private, not profit-distributing, self-governing and non-compulsory”. This 
structural operational definition was developed internationally as part of the Johns Hopkins University 
Comparative Non-profit Project (CNP). It is seen as appropriate for the New Zealand environment (Tennant et 
al., 2008) and is now in use within the New Zealand state sector. This definition of the community and 
voluntary sector as “organised, private, not profit-distributing, self-governing and non-compulsory” 
immediately becomes problematic however when the state, in its relationship with this sector, enters into what 
Saville-Smith and Bray (1994, p.7) called “market type relationships” and used “output based contracts and 
associated performance, accountability and audit requirements” to govern interactions with the community and 
voluntary sector. 
The definition which focuses on the functions of the community and voluntary sector is more complex. The 
separation of advocacy and service functions seems to be preferred for the community and voluntary sector in 
New Zealand when considering the definition provided in the Johns Hopkins study: 
Within the Johns Hopkins University study a distinction has been made between the role of non-profit 
organisations in providing tangible services, and wider functions such as advocacy, community 
building, connecting individuals, providing a home for „social movements‟, and acting as vehicles for a 
variety of other sentiments and impulses. To simplify descriptions of these roles, it has become 
convenient to group the 12 ICNPO [The International Classification of Non-Profit Organisations] (and 
now NZSCNPO [The New Zealand Standard Classification of Non–Profit Organisations]) categories 
into two broad general categories: service functions, which involve the delivery of direct services such 
as education, health, housing and community development, social services and the like; and expressive 
functions, which involve activities that provide avenues for the expression of cultural, religious, 
professional or policy values and interests. Included here are civic and advocacy; arts, culture, and 
recreation; environmental protection; and business, labour, religious, and professional representation. 
(Sanders et al., 2008, p.7) 
The authors also note the following: 
Salamon, Sokolowski & List (2003, p.20–22) acknowledge that the distinction between expressive and 
service functions is far from perfect and many organisations are engaged in both. Nevertheless, the 
distinction can help highlight the different roles that non-profit organisations can play. (Sanders, 
O‟Brien, Tennant, Sokolowski & Salamon, 2008, p.7) 
The distinction between the service and expressive functions has become the dominant approach found in New 
Zealand research and policy statements on the community and voluntary sector. 
The division between those whose function it is to provide services and those groups who provide political 
advocacy has some practical implications in New Zealand, for example it impacts upon which groups can 
achieve charitable status. Historically, charities were generally exempt from tax and donors were exempt 
from gift duty. According to the Charities Commission (2011), if organisations wanted formal recognition of 
their tax status they could apply to the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) for a „letter of comfort‟. However, 
such exemptions are not available to groups primarily engaged in political advocacy. 
Another issue that arises from the current preference for a functional definition centred on dividing service 
provision from advocacy work is that it leads to a situation where the value of the community and voluntary 
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sector is almost entirely measured in economic terms and quality is evaluated by its „efficiency‟ and 
„accountability‟ – its managerial competence. This focus indeed permeated the research on the community and 
voluntary sector in New Zealand as state financial constraints meant the withdrawal from the provision of 
services and a consequent increase in service demand on the sector with fewer resources (see Wheeler, 
Darby, McDonald & Cleaver, 1982; Fitzgerald & Cameron, 1989; Cull, 1993). 
In reality, many community and voluntary sector organisations function to provide both services to constituents 
as well as advocacy for policy and political change. As such, this research favours a more expansive 
functional definition such as that provided by Maddison et al. (2004) presented in the introduction of this 
report. The key to this definition is that the community and voluntary sector are essential intermediaries, not 
just in relation to service provision, but in terms of the generation and collation of knowledge for policy 
development. They are the voice of marginalised groups (see Maddison et al., 2004, p.vii). 
This role of acting as a voice for communities is acknowledged within the Johns Hopkins study as being the role 
of „expressive organisations‟ (Sanders et al., 2008, p.14) but focusing on democratic engagement by groups 
defined as „expressive organisations‟ would have meant an examination of the work of a very small number 
of organisations in New Zealand.4 Instead, we have included a wide range of social service organisations in 
our study: from those who primarily see their job as providing assistance to their constituencies and those who 
are focused on lobbying; we have included peak or umbrella groups, head offices, regional offices, and 
local/community organisations; and, our survey was sent to top-down, bureaucratic organisations and bottom-
up, non-hierarchical organisations focused on listening to the views of the local communities they serve. 
Before looking at whether these groups feel democracy is flourishing in New Zealand, with regard to the 
involvement of the community and voluntary sector in political debate, it is important to look at the context in 
which groups are operating. The simple task of examining how the community and voluntary sector was faring 
with regard to its democratic role was complicated by the lack of coherent discussions of the changing nature 
of the relationship between the sector and the state. It became evident that while there is research into the 
community and voluntary sector, and much research on the changing nature of the state over the last hundred 
years in New Zealand, very little work draws the two together. The next section of this report therefore 
explores the intersection between state and civil society. 
The relationship between the community and voluntary sector and the state is best seen as coming in three 
phases. In the first, the „welfare state‟ provided an environment which enabled collective advocacy. However, 
the fiscal and democratic crisis which beset the welfare state in the 1970s and 1980s sees a change in the 
actions and values of successive governments and their agents. This results in the second phase where the 
community and voluntary sector, once seen as a crucial way for marginalised groups to be represented, is 
now seen as „vested interests‟ and their subsequent role begins to be narrowed to that of „service providers‟. 
The final phase in the relationship between state and society centres on claims that from 1999 New Zealand 
was in a period of „Third Way‟ government – the consultation and partnership phase – when increased 
attention was given to the community and voluntary sector by the state. However, as will be seen in the 
examination of the relationship through secondary literature and in the responses from our survey participants, 
this attention has not led to an increase in the spaces for genuine democratic engagement. 
  
                                               
4 The Johns Hopkins study divides up the non-profit sector into categories based on whether they perform „service‟ or „expressive‟ functions. In 
all, 31% of the staff in the non-profit sector work for „expressive‟ organisations, but only 2% of the staff work in civic and advocacy 
organisations (the rest labelled expressive are cultural and recreational groups). See Sanders et al. (2008, p.16). 
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1.3  A „welfare state‟ predicated on collective advocacy  
During the middle decades of the 20th century, New Zealand‟s welfare state provided legitimate space for 
collective demands for redistribution of resources and recognition of marginalised groups. This is partially 
captured by Tennant et al. (2008, p.4) who state:  
In the absence of large-scale private philanthropy, the willingness of government to provide financial 
aid to selected organisations was important to their on-going existence. In the social service sector, an 
almost symbiotic relationship prevailed between key organisations and the post-World War II 
welfare state. 
One might add that perhaps the existence of the welfare state indeed structurally provided the rationale for, 
and efficacy of, the community and voluntary sector, and whatever role they played in the democratic process 
albeit in alignment with state policy. Though the post-World War II expansion of the state did impact upon 
the functioning of the community and voluntary sector according to Saville-Smith and Bray (1994, p.10): 
The responsibilities of the non-profit sector became increasingly peripheral and limited in service 
delivery. The activities of non-profit welfare agencies were primarily advocacy and what might be 
described as „grassroots community leadership. 
Perhaps importantly for the community and voluntary sector a system that is committed to generalised social, 
political, and civil rights – such as the welfare state of the mid-20th century – has an in-built receptivity for 
advocacy as of right. As Jesson (1992, p.367) notes: “Politicians didn‟t resent these demands on their time and 
energy, but regarded it as the texture of democracy.” 
In fact this acceptance of civil society involvement in political processes in New Zealand can be traced to the 
1890s and the adoption of elements of corporatism: 
New Zealand has had a strong element of corporatism in its history in matters such as state regulation 
of wage bargaining through the Arbitration Court and the national award system. (Mulgan, 2004, 
p.211) 
What changed in later decades is who was allowed to make demands of the state beyond workers. During 
the 20th century calls for redistribution from unions, the community and voluntary sector, interest groups, and 
social movements are evident and focus on a range of measures to assist unemployed, families, the sick, and 
solo parents between 1935 and 1970. 
Lobbying and advocacy work during the „welfare state‟ era was not just to be targeted at elected political 
elite, it was also targeted at those working in the public sector. According to Jesson (1992, pp.372-373): 
A key component to successful lobbying has always been access to the appropriate bureaucracy. 
Often this occurs naturally, through professional and social interaction, and through movement of 
personnel between the public service and the private sector. 
During the middle of the 20th century New Zealand had a very stable public sector that allowed for the 
development of fairly stable policy communities (Mulgan, 2004) or advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1993), 
which at times included community organisations. “In each sector of government, „policy communities‟ tend to 
develop consisting of ministers, public servants and key interest groups who share a concern for policy in that 
area” (Mulgan, 2004, p.210). And it was a receptive public service which took part in these policy 
communities. Dr. Alan Bollard, Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Secretary to The Treasury from 
1998–2002, in his „Preface‟ to Norman‟s „Obedient Servant‟ (2003, p.7) says that civil servants he knew 
considered themselves just that, “servants of the people” and further that “they felt privileged to be so .” 
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The result was levels of advocacy both for ever-expanding departmental resource needs and for the 
resolution of evident needs generated by inequality. However, a falling rate of profit, accompanied by 
Britain‟s movement into the European Union in 1973, a decline in the price of goods sold, as well as an 
increase in the cost of oil through the mid-1970s was followed by a finger-pointing exercise at state revenue 
expenditure (fiscal deficits) and state borrowing. This created enough political will and economic force to 
curtail the growth of the state, even though according to McClure (2003) the proportion of gross domestic 
profit going to social security had diminished in the 1960s and the 1972 increase in benefits was negated by 
non-indexation to wages or the cost of living in addition to inflation. The result was moves to curtail advocacy. 
The crisis of the 1970s was not just a fiscal crisis. By the end of the 1970s a welfare state that had been “a 
largely neutral entity merely managing the short term demands of different interest groups to ensure the 
public good” and having to “...accommodate the claims of new constituencies and minimise the competition 
between different constituencies for resources” transformed into what was called “the crisis of pluralist politics” 
(Saville-Smith & Bray, 1994, p.11). Increasing political and social claims by Maori, women, and 
environmentalists, led to turmoil in parliamentary politics with ministerial sackings; confusing government 
responses to complex issues with, for instance, income support being granted to sole parents at the same time 
that neighbours were encouraged to report on their behaviour to authorities if it was considered to contradict 
their need for help. In addition, there was the complex reaction to the 1981 Springbok Tour which became 
increasingly interlinked with Maori Sovereignty struggles. 
Smith (1996, p.7) argues that when the New Zealand Planning Council produced Social Policy Options in 
1987, it advised “...governments to shift responsibility towards the individuals and community … and away 
from the state‟s centralist responsibility”. The report stated that the government should move: 
…back to informality, with the family, workplace, voluntary societies employers and neighbourhood 
groups assuming more relative importance than in the past [emphasis in original]. (New Zealand 
Planning Council, 1987, p.21 cited in Smith, 1996, p.7) 
Smith notes how the Planning Council used the example of support groups for women and people with 
disabilities which had originated as initiatives from the community and therefore had, quoting the Planning 
Council, the: 
...desired attributes of flexibility, participation, greater co-ordination, efficiency and effectiveness, 
clearer definition of need and better targeting [and] increased self-reliance and of course they 
harness a financial contribution from the community to supplement that of the state. The Planning 
Council said the delivery of services by community based organisations, which can be achieved with 
the necessary transfer of resources and accountability, as preferable to direct delivery by state 
department. (New Zealand Planning Council, 1987, p.42 cited in Smith, 1996, p.7) 
The Royal Commission on Social Policy (1988) expressed this change slightly differently: 
The growth of community development and self-help groups became discernible from the mid-1970s, 
initially in relation to the social welfare or personal services area. The emerging groups differed from 
the established voluntary welfare agencies in their distrust of „professionals‟; their primary focus on 
needs specific to particular localities, or specific conditions, such as disability, or marital violence; and 
their preferred approach of sharing experiences and determining their own solutions to problems, 
rather than reliance on bureaucracies to provide solutions. (Royal Commission on Social Policy, Vol. II, 
1988, pp.780-781) 
The Report continues noting that these same groups got increased funding from special welfare and health 
areas and became so prolific that there was a suggestion that the state‟s role should be to “[empower] 
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people to come together to meet their own needs while providing funding for these groups and monitoring 
and regulating their activities” (Royal Commission on Social Policy, Vol. II, 1988, p.781). 
Saville-Smith and Bray suggest that despite attempts by the state to enhance information and advocacy 
services, establish consumer monitoring of social services, develop agency networking, and integrate services 
across departmental boundaries, the end result was “...a pervasive sense that state minimisation, rather than 
mere devolution, must become the goal for state restructuring” (1994, p.13). These crises generated a major 
change in both the state and, in turn, civil society. Wheeler et al. (1982, p.10) in research on non-statutory 
welfare organisations in Palmerston North, maintained that community and voluntary sector organisations 
surveyed by them expressed two “strong reservations” about government welfare policy: 
i. the feeling that „across the board‟ cuts are placing an increasing strain on the already limited 
resources of many groups, both by limiting the availability of resources, while at the same time, 
increasing demand for local groups to provide services traditionally offered by central government; 
and 
ii. reservations about the way in which welfare policy decisions are made, especially when such decisions 
involve decreased expenditure with consequent increases in service demand. 
These reservations were warranted. In 1983 the government terminated the Voluntary Organisations Job 
Creation Programme, which meant a lack of funding to start organisations and projects within the community 
and voluntary sector, and a heavier reliance on volunteer workers or scaled down services (Wheeler et al., 
1982). Subsequently in 1987 the government had terminated unemployment relief schemes (Project 
Employment Programme/Voluntary Organisations Training Programme) which had provided numerous 
community and voluntary sector organisations with paid staff plus some overheads. Their termination of staff 
and funding put pressure on the community and voluntary sector‟s ability to deliver services. After protests 
from the sector, the government initiated the Community Organisation Grants Scheme, but funds were 
restricted and available only for approved projects.  
The pluralist crisis, the fiscal crisis of the state, and a crisis in consumer confidence by the 1980s allowed the 
coalescence of some on the critical left (with their conception of the welfare state as social control) with those 
of the New Right (who maintained their notion of the welfare state as inefficient and costly) to morph into 
what Saville-Smith and Bray call the “humanist liberal” who pushed for “devolved service delivery” (1994, 
p.12). This led to a shift from what O‟Brien and Wilkes (1993) have called the „Fordist welfare state‟ to a 
new form of state. For O‟Brien and Wilkes (1993, p.45) the key features of the „Fordist welfare state‟ 
included “...social democracy, equity and, to a lesser extent, full employment” [emphasis in original]. They 
further note that the nature of democracy under this situation is one in which rights are extended and 
inequality diminished as opposed to the „PostFordist welfare state‟ (the neo-liberal contract state), where 
rights are diminished and inequality extended (O‟Brien & Wilkes, 1993, p.45-46). If there was an advocacy 
surplus under a „Fordist welfare state‟, events from the 1970s seemed to create an advocacy deficit. Tennant 
et al. (2008, p.4) note that: 
....the 1990s saw the most conflicted period in the relationship between the sectors. This reflected 
changes within the public sector, the much larger scale of financial transfers between government and 
non-profits, and the ascendancy of purchase of service contracts as the basis of the relationship. 
1.4  A constrained community voice in a „neo-liberal contract state ‟  
The relationship between the state and civil society was altered from 1984 with the rise of the neo-liberal 
contract state. With New Zealand‟s variant of neo-liberalism came acceptance of New Public Management 
(NPM) and public choice rhetoric. This „market liberal‟ model of interest group politics “...depicts interest 
groups as self-interested, „vested‟ interests, seeking special advantages or „privileges‟ for themselves which 
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are contrary to the public interest and to the long term prospects of the country” (Olson 1982, Vowles 1993 
cited in Mulgan 2004, p.212). This view is found in the speeches and writings of New Zealand‟s political 
architect of neo-liberalism, Roger Douglas. In one speech he noted that interest group lobbying served only to 
slow down the pace of economic reform (Douglas, 1991 cited in Jesson 1992, p.372):  
By 1984, when Labour took office, the power of the lobby groups had become one of the main 
obstacles to economic and social progress. Blunting their power was the real role of the Economic 
Summit of that year. Having forced them into a commitment to put NZ first, we used the 1984 budget 
to hit the privileges of all the interests groups at once. 
Similar views infused democracies around the world. For example, Cull (1993, p.18) had noted that this 
process had already started in England with the Wolfenden Committee report (1978) which had, in her 
words: 
Isolated voluntary organisations engaging in „pressure activities‟ (e.g. Greenpeace) as being unlikely 
to receive government funding. . . . Butler and Wilson (1990) view this as the state legitimising some 
area of voluntary activity while others are seen as radical and therefore unfunded. Government 
discourages the „radical pressure groups, single issue activity groups and political ideological groups‟. 
Public choice rhetoric was actively used to distance public sector actors from interest groups in order to avoid 
„capture‟. This is particularly evident with policy ministries like the Ministry of Women‟s Affairs and Te Puni 
Kokiri (Ministry of Maori Affairs). These groups were in the past seen as conduits for the voices of women and 
Maori in the policy process. However, government documentation from the centre of the state, including some 
from the State Services Commission and Treasury, in the 1990s and early 21st century make it clear that an 
„advocacy role‟ was not in line with new public sector ethos (an ethos informed in part by public choice 
theorising) (Teghtsoonian, 2004). 
Public servants were also seen as rational self-maximising agents, seeking to advance their own position 
through expansion of their area of work, their department, and their division. Under the welfare state the 
public sector, in Weberian terms, was doomed to produce an ever growing bureaucracy as departments were 
expanded to fit the tasks invented and a commensurate staff of „civil servants‟ recruited (see Shaw 1999, 
p.189). The New Zealand‟s public sector did produce an ever growing bureaucracy. From 1984 the solution 
was seen to lie in dividing up the policy and provision roles carried out by the public sector, through 
corporatisation and privatisation of non-core government services and, implementing private business models 
in the public service, resulting in an end to long tenures and permanency of position. 
These very fundamental changes made to the public sector have had lasting impact. Twenty thousand 
„advocates‟ for public services were made redundant. NPM became the order of the day as accountability 
and austerity in state sector performance drove legislative and policy changes. Also, the accounting 
procedure base of the state sector changed from input-based to output-based at the same time that the 
dominant economic rationale switched from demand-side to supply-side economics. The welfare state was not 
to be one that allocated according to need but one that allocated, after the substantial reduction of benefits, 
to “...ensure resources would go to the people who could make the best use of them” (Larner, 1996, p.35). 
The job losses themselves also created difficulties for those seeking to provide knowledge for policy making. 
As Michael Mintrom (2006, p.538) notes:  
In particular, it is now widely acknowledged that reductions in the number of staff employed in the 
public sector, along with fragmentation of advice-giving and service-delivery roles, have reduced the 
capacity of government departments and ministries to develop policy advice that raises and assesses 
fundamental, strategic, and long-term policy concerns. 
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Mintrom (2006) says that this then left space for think-tanks – „new voices‟ – to enter the policy conversation, 
though most of these think-tanks are well-funded, (and almost exclusively) right-wing bodies. Less well-funded 
civil society organisations (such as many of those surveyed for this report) did not have the capacity to enter 
policy conversations on these new terms. 
Further difficulty came with the move to output-based accounting for public expenditure. Prior to the advent 
of the Public Finance Act 1989, government grants were the usual form of funding for organisations in the 
community and voluntary sector, and expectations in grant funding did not focus on specific outputs being 
delivered. With the Public Finance Act, grants became contracts with more tightly defined outputs. The input 
system of the welfare state had been changed for the audited and measured output system of the neo-liberal 
contract state. The effect can be seen in the documents of state agencies. For example, in a report on the New 
Zealand Community Funding Agencies (NZCFA),5 northern regional manager, Wendy Reid, noted: 
This approach is quite different to a community development model which would see NZCFA in the 
role of resource provider, that is funding the aspirations presented by the community with little or no 
element of state control ….we would not fund somebody who was a community development worker 
whose job it was to go around everybody making sure they were happy. We would not fund that 
because there is no discernible output which fits with our NDOC [Non-Departmental Output Class] 
structure. (Waitangi Tribunal, 1998, p.83) 
In the same report Patrick Kelly, described as an “outreach worker for CFA”, (the interface between the CFA 
and the provider, essentially approving and monitoring funding) stated (The Waitangi Tribunal, 1998, p.86): 
…what the Government wants its social service agencies to achieve may not always correspond to 
what a community wants, either in the specifics or in the manner or timing of its achievement …. under 
the community development model, the community „calls the shots‟. 
In 1993 then Minister of Social Welfare, Jenny Shipley, noted the shift in direction by affirming that the 
allocation of funds by the NZCFA was “building an excellent bridge in the partnership between the Government 
and the community to provide social services” [emphasis in original] (CFA, 1993 cited in Saville-Smith & Bray, 
1994, p.6). Higgins (1997) also notes the dramatic change that occurred between 1991 and 1993, by 
quoting directly from Department of Social Welfare (DSW) plans, as priorities were shifted in line with 
government redirection from: 
All people in New Zealand are able to participate within the communities to which they belong. (DSW 
1991b, p.6 cited in Higgins, 1997, n.p.) 
. . . to: 
Policies for social welfare contribute to a fair and just society and promote self-sufficiency and 
responsibility of individuals and their families/whanau. (DSW 1993:30i, in Higgins, 1997, n.p.) 
It seems that the NZCFA and the Government consciously abandoned community development for service 
development. This meant that the perceived success of community funding was measureable by performance 
outputs rather than social outcomes, and were more easily subject to fiscal control and monitoring under the 
State Sector Act and the Public Finance Act. Larner and Craig describe this as a “more punitive phase . . . 
                                               
5 The NZCFA had been a separate business unit of the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) since 1992, responsible for “...allocating 
resources and support to community groups and organisations working in the area of social services delivery”. (Waitangi Tribunal, 1998, 
p.81) 
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which saw an extension of the marketisation programme accompanied by the introduction of neo-conservative 
and/or authoritarian policies and programmes in the area of social policy” (2005, p.407). Similarly, Martin 
states that new contract models stymied innovation in the community (1995, pp.44-46). 
The result of this change in the public service was the reduction of space to advocate on behalf of 
marginalised New Zealanders as claims-making was philosophically unacceptable and changes in state 
structures had undermined access to the traditional allies of the community and voluntary sector. The loss of 
power experienced by unions, who had during the welfare state era worked in corporatist style arrangements 
with the state and businesses on the nation‟s economic and social issues, has been well documented. However, 
as Jesson notes (1992, p.377): 
Many other organisations have also lost influence during the changes of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Beneficiaries, unemployed organisations, the traditional public service, community groups and even 
local bodies, all proved powerless to prevent damaging changes to their situations. Consensus and 
pluralism are – for the moment – a dead letter in New Zealand politics, with the balance of influence 
shifting to business and finance in a culture of thoroughgoing commercialisation. 
What is even more problematic is that the changes to the New Zealand economy, state, and society from 
1984 increased the need for advocacy just as the state funding was being tightened. A survey of New 
Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations (NZFVWO)6 members (which were variously funded 
by thirteen government departments in 1990-91) gauged trends in the voluntary sector. The concerns 
expressed included increases in client numbers and demands, decreases in funding, increases in workloads, 
and problems in recruiting volunteers. The study concluded (NZFVWO, 1992, p.8): 
Other concerns raised by agencies ranged from the large amount of time spent on advocacy, to 
increasing staff stress and problems created by changing government policy and government 
departments ….keeping member groups informed about changes in government policy and in making 
submissions means they do not have enough time to put into meeting the needs of clients. 
Larner and Craig maintain that the environment delegitimised expertise gained by years of experience, 
replacing it with imposed requirements of “managerialism”, “professionalisation”, “skill development”, and 
“technical capacity” – all terms which offer a common sense understanding but are often expressed without an 
explanation of actual implications (2005, pp.408-409). These imposed qualities, which came out of the 
intensely competitive environment, produced distrust between organisations in the community and voluntary 
sector (which had formerly co-operated with each other) and exhaustion in organisations which are, out of 
necessity, in constant negotiation with government. Additionally, these pressures often diminished the breadth 
of what the community and voluntary sector felt was needed in regard to services offered (Larner & Craig, 
2005, p.409). In the rush to eradicate inefficiency and the lack of accountability, the state‟s response to the 
sector had created competition for funds within the sector. This became a competition for clients, increasing the 
frequency of applications for funds (Cull documents one organisation making 118 applications for funding in 
1991-1992 with a 12% success rate (Cull, 1993, p.23), which implied that social problems are of a short 
duration and allowed the imposition of business models on the sector. Cull (1993, p.20) quotes Wallis (1991, 
p.28): 
But in recent years, both in New Zealand and worldwide, the demarcation line between operating a 
prosperous non-profit and commercial enterprise has blurred. [emphasis in original] 
The shift in attitude can be found within the documents of the community and voluntary sector. Wallis has 
noted that the Crippled Children Society (CCS) appointed John Lister, the New Zealand (manager of Watties 
                                               
6 NFVWO has changed its trading name to Social Development Partners, see http://www.socialdevelopment.org.nz/ 
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Industry) as their Chief Executive Officer, “...an advocate of the necessity for transferring business strategies 
into the voluntary sector” (Wallis, 1991, pp.28-30 cited in Cull, 1993, p.23). Lister is quoted as saying: 
You can‟t survive on bottle drives today, and charities can go bankrupt just as quickly as anyone else. 
We must be as sharp as any commercial organisation out there.[emphasis in original] (Wilson, 1991, 
p.28 cited in Cull, 1993, p.23) 
The question is whether this period of neo-liberal contract state continues with the election of the Labour-led 
coalition government in 1999? 
1.5  Speaking for the marginalised in a „Th ird Way‟ state?  
It is argued that in the nine years following the 1999 election, under three successive Labour-led coalition 
governments, New Zealand moved away from the neo-liberal agenda and turned back towards a social 
democratic approach to economy and state. Political science and public policy literature present an optimistic 
view of interest group involvement in politics under this new „social democracy‟ (Tenbensel, 2006; Shaw & 
Eichbaum, 2008). Tenbensel (2006, p.533) claims: 
 … the Clark government has adopted much of the style and substance of the „Third Way‟ in its 
emphasis on „inclusion‟, „partnership‟, „networks‟, and „stakeholder involvement‟ in policy development 
and implementation. This certainly does indicate an ideological shift to accepting the legitimacy of 
interest groups in general. 
Larner and Craig (2005) argue that this constitutes the third shift in policy characterised by a “partnering” 
ethos and in which discourses of “social inclusion” and “social investment” sit awkwardly alongside more 
obviously neo-liberal elements such as economic globalisation, market activation, and contractualism (Larner 
2003, p.510; Larner & Craig 2005, p.407). While presented as a shift in governance style, many of the 
comments about the state post-1999 seem to reflect the belief that centre-left governments will be more 
receptive to collective advocacy. A substantial body of research shows that left-party strength creates 
opportunities for black and indigenous rights groups, workers, women, and other „left-leaning‟ political 
movements (Costain 1992; Jenkins 1985; Jenkins, Jacobs & Agnone, 2003; Della Porta & Diani, 2006). It is 
also argued that the shift to the mixed-member proportional voting system (MMP) in New Zealand presented 
good possibilities for community and voluntary organisations (Shaw and Eichbaum 2008, p.196). 
The partnership model adopted since 1999 at first glance appears to have opened space for civil society 
organisations and allowed the newly produced professional advocates to be involved in policy processes, 
though much of the focus has been on the provision of social services to address complex social problems and 
consequently depoliticise negotiations with the central government and other professionals. As Larner and 
Craig (2005, p.411) note, activists might have received more “...recognition within organisations and in job 
descriptions”, but they were “...increasingly required to make their political claims technical, or turn their 
contests into collaboration” (Larner & Craig, 2005, p.419). What the third phase did facilitate, according to 
Larner and Craig (2005, p. 418), was the creation of a new circulating elite who plied their skills between 
local and national government departments and community groups. 
In 2001 the New Zealand government formally recognised the role of the community and voluntary sector, but 
stopped short of legitimising their advocacy role, supplanting it instead with the notion of partnership (Ministry 
of Social Development, 2001, n.p. [emphasis in original]): 
An independent and vibrant community sector is essential to a healthy civil society. Government and 
the community sector depend on each other to achieve shared goals of social participation, social 
equity and strengthened communities …. Government will be an active partner in building a 
relationship based on honesty, trust and integrity – tika and pono; compassion and caring – aroha and 
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manaakitanga; and recognition of diversity …Government sees a future where the state performs its 
role as a facilitator of a strong civil society based on a respectful relationship between government 
and community, voluntary and iwi/Maori organisations. 
Other phrases that permeated the document included: “mutual interests”; “two way communication”; “working 
together”; and, breaking down “silos” and “establishing co-ordinated, inter-sectoral policies and 
programmes” (Ministry of Social Development, 2001, n.p.). 
By 2003 Treasury‟s guidelines on contracts with the community and voluntary sector promoted one version of 
the „vibrant civil society‟ by acknowledging the need to respect the autonomy of the voluntary sector 
(Treasury, 2003, p.10). Though in practice, this autonomy came into direct tension with the need for 
government departments to ensure contracts “contribute to the achievement of Government outcomes and 
objectives” (The Treasury, 2003, p.3). The guidelines specified that any agreement between the Crown and 
community and voluntary organisations should be informed by the outcomes intended, but that (The Treasury, 
2003, p.14):  
[The definition of services] will need to strike a careful balance between: 
 Including enough detail to ensure there is certainty (for both the NGO and Government 
purchase) as to the nature and scope of the service. 
 Allowing the NGO flexibility. 
While community and voluntary sector organisations “are not simply an extension of Government” (The 
Treasury, 2003, p.5), research with organisations in the sector suggests they do change their goals to align 
with government objectives in order to secure funding (Grey, 2007). While the political will from 1999 might 
have been to increase the connections between the state and civil society organisations, the massive changes 
to the operations, rules, and conventions of the public sector inflicted from 1984 continues to impact on the 
relationships between civil society and the state. As Cribb (2005, p.47) notes: 
Current mechanisms are based on the assumption of agency theory (Anderson & Dovey, 2003). A 
principal (government agency) contracts with an agent (voluntary organisation) to deliver services on 
their behalf. The agent is assumed to have different interests from the principal and as such will act 
self-interestedly when the opportunity arises. To ensure the agent does what the principal expects 
them to do, external monitoring, reporting, sanctions and incentives are put in place‟ (Jenkins and 
Mecklin, 1976). 
Nowland-Foreman (1997, p.11) summarises the net results: 
Ironically changes in government funding technologies …. in tandem with moves to reduce the ro le 
and size of government, cut „red tape‟ and regulation, are seeing far greater levels of control by 
government over voluntary organisations than ever have occurred in the past. They are shifting the 
focus of government funders away from integration, coordination and effectiveness towards an 
overriding concern with competitive efficiencies. Outputs and even outcomes have come to mean 
quantities rather than qualities. And an almost exclusive focus on demand has left issues of supply to 
„find their own equilibrium‟. 
What is rarely acknowledged by the state in its consultation guidelines and partnership processes is the 
power imbalance within the relationship. As Geddes (2001, p.194) concludes: “Local partnerships therefore 
offer the excluded a stake in the market, but, as is the case for small shareholders generally, this may not be 
a stake that carries much clout”. Devolution of power had not been accompanied in New Zealand by greater 
democracy at the local level (Bale, 2003, p.210), or greater substantive democracy for those in the 
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community and voluntary sector. The partnership model may have led to greater state control of organisations 
in the community and voluntary sector, a concentration on meeting „needs‟ of state (where money is) and a 
denial of adequate space for advocacy work. It is important to critique who controls the „reinvigorated‟ 
approaches to consultation which were at the heart of the New Zealand „Third Way‟ agenda.  
The very rhetoric around „partnership‟ is problematic. “The term raises expectations of an equality of status (if 
not resources) that can be difficult to achieve in practice where one party is the State” (Building better 
Government Engagement Reference Group, 2008, p.13). We agree with Evans and Shields when they note 
that the not for profit sector, “…has been accorded a central place in the governance models…[they] are 
being asked to perform an enhanced role not only in the delivery of „public services‟ but also in a restructured 
state-societal relationship …. moving it away from its core mission, commercialising the sector‟s operations, 
and compromising its autonomy” (Evans & Shields, 2006, p.2). Such a compromise may have driven the 
trajectory of Barnardos New Zealand, “the country‟s leading agency promoting the welfare of children and 
their families” (Levine 2009, p.161) toward a more integrated service approach. As Levine notes, the New 
Zealand organisation has an annual budget of $40 million (2008) coming largely from two government 
departments, but Levine (2009, pp.161-162) says he does not know if putting their efforts to provide more 
integrated services under the spotlight constitute resistance to neo-liberalism or accommodation of the 
philosophy. 
There is some indication that community and voluntary sector organisations under the „Third Way‟ state were 
being affected by the on-going drive to separate out political and policy advocacy from service provision (or 
purchasing in the case of many government departments) – a move first enacted in the core public sector, but 
now incumbent upon all organisations contracted by the state to provide social services. This situation was 
tested on October 3 2003 when questions were raised in parliament “….about the propriety of Ministry of 
Health (MoH) contracts with some antismoking groups that included clauses requiring the lobbying of MPs” 
(Brazier & Hunn, 2003, p.3). At the time, the MoH had contracted a number of antismoking community and 
voluntary sector organisations, including Action Smoking and Health (ASH), Aparangi Tautoko Auahi Kore, 
Smokefree Coalition, Alcohol Healthwatch, Manukau City Council, and the Obesity Action Coalition which, 
within the scope of the contract, made provision for active lobbying of MPs. According to Brazier and Hunn 
(2003, p.3), this action breached “...public service standards of political neutrality” and as a result violated 
the “...public service rules and Code of Conduct” (Brazier & Hunn, 2003, p.3). They further maintained that: 
The enthusiasm and energy of public health staff have coloured the approach to NGOs contracting. 
This desire to engage and help resolve key public health issues is commendable although it does not 
make political lobbying any less unacceptable (Brazier and Hunn 2003, p.3). 
The recommendations that emanated from this report were that the MoH‟s future contracts with the community 
and voluntary sector should: 
 explicitly exclude lobbying activities 
 cease the use of the word „advocacy‟ in contracts and substitute a precise statement of the services 
being purchased 
 ensure that services purchased are specific to information provision activities 
 ensure that the Ministry staff receive instruction and training on the avoidance of lobbying 
requirements and on substituting advocacy with more precise expectations (Brazier & Hunn, 2003, p. 
4). 
The „vibrant civil society‟ had now received succinct guidelines – contracts with the various community and 
voluntary sector organisations named above were to be suspended pending negotiations (Brazier & Hunn, 
2003, p.4). At the time according to the MoH this affected an estimated 1400 contracts with the community 
and voluntary sector which had to be reviewed (MoHb, 2003, p.3). 
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The New Zealand Drug Foundation, the Cancer Society, and the Public Health Association commissioned policy 
consultant Diane Salter and a reference group to produce an assessment of, and response to, the Hunn-
Brazier report in 2004. This response identified that, although this issue focused only on the health sector, it 
was germane to many “social service and environmental organisations” (Salter, 2004, p.6). Their report 
clearly took issue with the contracted view of the community and voluntary sector and suggested that a 
„vibrant civil society‟ had been precisely the result of the activity of the sector (Salter, 2004, p.3). Amongst 
their findings which took issue with the recommendations with regard to „advocacy‟ roles of the community and 
voluntary sector were the following: 
…placing the same constraints on NGOs as on the core public agency that funds them puts at risk the 
valuable contribution that NGOs make to sound public decision making. Indeed it puts in doubt the 
raison d’etre for the existence of some NGOs.  
...The NGO sector plays a crucial role in representing the views of its stakeholders to government, in 
particular those of unheard and minority views. The sector‟s strength derives from the diversity of its 
membership and sources of support...the people who work and volunteer in the sector are drawn from 
a range of backgrounds and bring with them a wealth of experience, expertise, knowledge and 
ideas.  
...In most democratic countries NGOs play a vital leadership role in developing and participating in 
policies, programmes and services that improve and enhance society [emphasis in original] (Salter, 
2004, pp.6-8). 
 
The report draws specific attention to the critical role played by the Royal New Zealand Plunket Society, 
whose organisations and activities resulted in the six Karitane hospitals, numerous branches, and the reduction 
of child mortality from 88 per 1,000 to 32 per 1,000 in 1937( Salter, 2004, p.10). It was noted that, “[o]ver 
many years and on many issues, they have made submissions to Executive Government – at Ministerial and 
officials level – and to the legislature – appearing at Select Committee hearings and briefing individual MPs” 
(Salter, 2004, p.11). Similarly, it was noted that over a period of 25 years community and voluntary 
organisations concerned with tobacco control had made considerable impact as advocates for “...the 
[reduction of] advertising and promotion of cigarettes and also the measures to protect workers from second-
hand smoke” (Salter, 2004, p.11). This work was done with the aid of government funding to ASH in the 
1980s, the Coalition Against Tobacco Advertising and Sponsorship in the late 1980s, and the Smokefree 
Coalition in the mid-1990s. The report continues: 
Without this advocacy, it is doubtful whether the Government would have gained sufficient public 
support to carry through the legislative changes. These measures were important in achieving the 
greatest decline in the prevalence of smoking in the OECD in the 1990s and thereby saved hundreds 
of premature deaths. (Salter, 2004, p.11) 
Salter argues that in market economies with considerable power imbalances between business and both 
government and civil society, the community and voluntary sector was a significant contributor to a 
government‟s “effective regulatory systems”, and that governments should therefore be supportive of such 
“countervailing voices”. (Slater, 2004, p.11) 
Internationally, it is not unheard of for governments to actively support funding to community and voluntary 
sector groups for their roles as advocates for policy and political change. The Hunn-Brazier report noted that 
the Canadian government had signed an Accord with community and voluntary sector organisations. In 
contradistinction to the New Zealand agreement in 2001, the Canadian agreement maintained that:  
The independence of voluntary sector organizations includes their right within the law to challenge 
public policies, programs and legislation and to advocate for change; and…Advocacy is inherent to 
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debate and change in a democratic society and, subject to the above principles, it should not affect 
any funding relationship that might exist. (Voluntary Sector Initiative (Canada), 2001, p.8) 
The Canadian government funding guidelines in the same document listed advocacy as an activity that could 
be funded by the Government of Canada and stated that: 
Funding may be provided to promote representative voices on emerging issues that are important to 
the delivery of departmental and agency mandates, and for advocating changes in public policy. 
Advocacy is defined as „the act of speaking or disseminating information intended to influence 
individual behaviour or opinion, corporate conduct, or public policy and law. (Voluntary Sector 
Initiative (Canada), 2001, p.22) 
In Australia, for much of the 20th century, successive governments had provided operational funding for 
advocacy work by civil society organisations, recognising the need to ensure robust democratic debate on 
issues. However, during the Howard government this changed: 
Whereas operational funding was previously made available to strengthen „weak voices‟ in policy 
debate and to balance the influence of powerful business and professional interests, this is now 
framed as privileging various „industries‟ that have a vested interest in expanding the welfare state – 
whether the poverty industry, the multicultural industry, the Aboriginal industry or the feminist industry 
(Sawer, 2007, p.24) 
The linguistic shift to equate NGO industries‟ activities with that of „powerful business and professional 
interests‟ is alarming. Similarly, in New Zealand it seems the direction in the early part of the 21st century has 
not been towards greater acknowledgement and support for community driven advocacy, but rather a 
rejection of it. This has been played out in the public arena with regard to who gets charitable status. 
Attacks on the charitable status are not new. For example, during the 1970s there was an attack against the 
Council of Organisations for Relief Services Overseas (CORSO), one of New Zealand‟s most respected, well 
known and early-established community and voluntary sector organisations (1944), which had organised and 
coordinated aid to overseas countries (Sutton, Baskerville & Cordery, 2006). This organisation was effectively 
an umbrella group for many organisations interested in overseas aid. However, with the changing 
international debates about development and under-development, a growing concern about poverty in New 
Zealand and issues of Maori struggle, CORSO politicised its focus. The conservatism of the National Council of 
Churches was supplanted by the radical Christian World Service, radical younger women replaced older and 
more conservative women, and the Maori Council was admitted to CORSO membership. A documentary was 
released in 1979 entitled A Fair Deal which highlighted the effect of New Zealand‟s trade on exploited 
labour in Hong Kong, as well as poverty amongst Maori and the disadvantaged in New Zealand. This led to 
government action. On the 19th of September 1979, under the initiative of the then Prime Minister Robert 
Muldoon, the government terminated the tax exempt status and the $40,000 annual government grant to 
CORSO (Sutton et al., 2006, p.12). While supportive donations for CORSO continued the overall donations 
halved since 1971 (Sutton et al., 2006). 
The more politicised approach has cost CORSO dearly but they were not the last New Zealand organisation 
to be caught up in a row over their function and whether it was charitable. The focus on a separation of 
advocacy and service provision work for groups seeking charitable status has sharpened since 1979. As has 
already been noted, the critical question for registration for charitable status centres on what constitutes 
charitable purposes. The Charities Commission uses the “well-established common law test” which includes one 
or more of: “the relief of poverty”, “the advancement of education”, “the advancement of religion” or “any 
other matters that are beneficial to the community” (Charities Commission, 2009, p.3). The Commission asserts 
that: “An organisation may qualify for registration if it has a secondary or supplementary non-charitable 
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function (such as advocacy) as part of its charitable purpose” (Charities Commission, 2008, p.2; and, Charities 
Commission 2009, p.3). By 2008 the notion of „advocacy‟ was further defined. An organisation can have 
advocacy as a purpose and still register as a charity if it is “representational advocacy” or if it is “political 
advocacy which is ancillary [that is not the main purpose or is secondary, subordinate or incidental] to [the 
organisation‟s] main charitable purpose” (Charities Commission, 2008, p.1). The Commission again defers to 
common law and chooses to see advocacy of political parties or for a law change by organisations as a 
matter pertaining to all voters and/or parliament and therefore not the prerogative of charitable 
organisations. However, the Commission further states that: 
While organisations established to pursue political purposes will not meet the charitable purpose test, 
organisations established for exclusively charitable purposes may carry out campaigning and political 
activities, provided that the activities pursued are a legitimate means of furthering those purposes. 
(Charities Commission, 2008, p.2) 
In the end it seems likely the Commission can and will use their discretion in granting charitable status; this is 
confirmed by personal communication with the Commission. The side on which they might err when it comes to 
deciding the difference between lobbying for a law change to further “your charitable purposes”, or 
alternatively “having a political purpose”, is unknown (Charities Commission, 2008, p.2). 
Since 2007 the Commission has removed 1,000 organisations from the register of charities and declined 
1,350 applications for charitable status (Fowler, 2010). In April 2010 the Commission rejected the application 
by Greenpeace for registered charity status. The rationale touches on the problems faced by groups who are 
active in carrying out political advocacy. The Commission states that Greenpeace‟s “...promotion of 
disarmament and peace is political rather than educational” and that while the organisation did not advocate 
illegal activities, it had itself acted illegally (Fowler, 2010). The decision was to be appealed and their 
lawyer argued that if public benefit was the test of charitable purpose then surely peace and disarmament 
should satisfy the criterion (Fowler, 2010).7 
Another well publicised case in 2010 centred on the Charities Commission proposal to de-register the 
National Council of Women New Zealand (NCWNZ). This organisation has existed since 1896 and was 
concerned about the amendments to the Charities Act 2006, which effectively gave the Charities Commission 
Board the powers to remove an organisation from their register. Sid Ashton, Board Chairman, had stated in 
2006 that “...advocacy with any political purpose or with the purpose of inciting action” would not constitute 
legitimate aims of a charitable organisation (“NZPA Charities fear being Sanctioned for Speaking Out”, 
2006). The NCWNZ argued that the changes would inhibit public participation in political debate. National‟s 
finance spokesman, John Key (now the Prime Minister), said in 2006 that the changes in the Act would be a 
threat to charities‟ income, and that “threat is a powerful incentive for these organisations to toe [sic] the line 
but it's not in the country's interest that the Government effectively gags them," (“NZPA Charities fear being 
Sanctioned for Speaking Out”, 2006).The NCWNZ case highlights tensions that are inherent in any moves to 
define the community and voluntary sector along the lines of functions performed. The NCWNZ is currently 
contracted by the government to “provide advocacy and representation” (NCWNZ, 2010). According to the 
New Zealand Labour party, “The NCW has tackled the Government where it has failed women such as night 
class cuts, reduced support for victims of sexual abuse, scrapping pay equity initiatives and training incentive 
allowance cuts” (New Zealand Labour Party, 2010). The NCWNZ national president, Elizabeth Bang, says: 
“We are in a catch-22 situation...One side of government contracts us to advocate, while the other side seeks 
to punish us for this” (NCWNZ, 2010). This experience is directly comparable to the anticipated outcomes of 
the Australian study discussed at the opening of this report.  
                                               
7 The Court of Appeal set aside the Charities Commission‟s 2010 decision to decline Greenpeace‟s Charitable status after the High Court 
had upheld the decision in 2011. The Court of Appeal referred the decision back to the Department of Internal Affairs Charities Regulation 
Board for reconsideration (National Business Review, 11 March, 2013). Greenpeace was quoted as saying they would take the case to the 
Supreme Court (ibid.). 
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In 2010, the Minister of Community and Voluntary Sector announced (at the Charities Commission‟s annual 
general meeting) a „first principles‟ review of the Charities Act. This review, which would take place between 
2012 and 2015 under the Department of Internal Affairs8, in addition to current regulatory changes to make 
existing processes improved, would in the Minister‟s words “...lead to improved public confidence in the sector” 
(Turia, 2010). The Minister also acknowledged that (Turia, 2010): 
The review highlighted for me the fact that the regulatory environment the wider non-profit sector 
operates in is fragmented and confusing. In fact some would call it „antiquated‟. . . . Registered 
organisations must continue to qualify for registration, or public trust and confidence in charities will be 
compromised. Being registered also assures members of the public that an organisation‟s activities are 
genuinely charitable. 
The priorities of the Minister seem to err on the side of making sure the sector is legitimate in the state‟s and 
public‟s eyes, as opposed to delivering the services to the community, or fostering advocacy on behalf of the 
community. 
As Casey and Dalton have argued, it may also be the case that defining an „advocacy role‟ in the current 
political context is challenging (2006, p.35). They note Melville and Perkins (2003) research which suggests 
that some organisations are adjusting while others are “… simply frustrated that the same old lobbying tactics 
do not work in a new policy environment” (Casey & Dalton, 2006, p.35). Contracting arrangements (which 
became the dominant model under which organisations received state funding from the neo-liberal contract 
state) are impacting upon the will to carry out advocacy work. There is a feeling that community and 
voluntary sector organisations must avoid “drawing attention to ourselves in case we lose our funding”, or as 
one survey respondent put it they must avoid “biting the hand that feeds them”. This is recognised by 
Tenbensel (2006, p.533):  
…the more dependent such organisations are on government funding, and the more they are required 
to account for the delivery of services within frameworks defined by government, the less they are 
able to be critical of government policy in that area. In the face of sustained criticism, the government 
has the power to reduce the organisation‟s funding. 
So what is the reality for community and voluntary sector organisations with regard to political advocacy 
work and democratic debate? Are they feeling constrained by the terms of a neo-liberal contract state 
centred on output funding and a recasting of all political actors as „self-interested‟? Or is their world 
brightened by the renewal of social democracy under the „New Zealand Way‟, which is argued to have 
opened up avenues for partnership and consultation between the state and community and voluntary sector 
organisations? And what is the new direction from the National-led coalition? In order to explore these 
questions, this project uses survey data from 153 community and voluntary sector organisations working in the 
social service sector. This data depicts the complex relationship between the state and those wanting to better 
the lives of marginalised New Zealanders, as well as the difficulties faced by groups wanting to speak out 
against government policy, processes, and outcomes.  
                                               
8 Under the Charities Amendment Act (No. 2 ) 2012, the Charities Commission was wound up and its core functions moved to the Department 
of Internal Affairs to „reduce spending and administration, while keeping services”. It is known as the Department of Internal Affairs-
Charities. For more details see: http://www.charities.govt.nz/faqs/charities-commission-s-functions-moving-to-internal-affairs/ accessed 18 
March 2013. 
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2 THE SURVEY AND DATABASE 
As noted earlier, this study on the role of the community and voluntary sector in democracy is built on a survey 
created by The Australia Institute. The Institute allowed us to replicate the survey instrument they used to 
evaluate the role of the community and voluntary sector in Australian democracy under the Howard 
government. The original survey instrument contained 35 questions; a number of which were not relevant to 
the New Zealand study as they related to the federal nature of the state in Australia. Once these questions 
were removed, the research team consulted a number of peak body organisations to refine the New Zealand 
survey instrument. This included incorporating questions which asked about democracy under Labour-led 
governments between 1999 and 2008; and the National-led government since 2008. While at the time of 
surveying the National-led coalition had only been governing for a little over six months, it seemed crucial to 
separate out the two periods of decision-making given our interest in whether it is the mode of state 
governance or the ideological leaning of political parties which impacts upon advocacy by the community and 
voluntary sector. 
The final survey instrument contains 32 questions. The questions are grouped into four major sections: 1) the 
interaction of the community and voluntary sector with government decision-making processes; 2) the „Third 
Way‟ governance approach to consultation in place between 1999 and 2008; 3) exploring the intersection 
of government funding and participation in public debate; and finally, 4) the respondents are asked for 
information about their organisation. 
With the survey refined we moved to build a database from which to select research participants. We aimed 
to develop a database of groups that reflected the shape of the New Zealand community and voluntary 
sector as much as possible. Following Sanders et al. (2008), we used the number of staff in each category as 
a proxy for the size of each part of the community and voluntary sector. The Johns Hopkins study provided 
data which aided us in ensuring our database reflected the range of advocacy potential and service 
provision in New Zealand‟s community and voluntary sector, at least in terms of the types of services. For our 
study, the complication in terms of mapping out the „social service‟ arm of the community and voluntary sector 
– our primary concern – is that the Johns Hopkins study covers all „non-profits‟. The 2007 Non-Profit Institutions 
Satellite Accounts reported that there were 97,000 non-profit institutions in New Zealand, only 45% of which 
were engaged in arts, culture, sport and recreation while 12% provided social services and 10% represented 
religious institutions (Statistics New Zealand, 2007, pp.3 &14). To get an accurate picture of what the sector 
looked like we needed to recalculate the relative size of each of the relevant categories for our study – 
education and research, health, social services, development and housing, civic and advocacy, philanthropy, 
international activities – in relation to the social service sector alone (See Table 1). 
Having established the proportions of the non-profit sector for each field of provision, we began building our 
database from readily accessible addresses of nationally organised peak social service groups. For national 
organisations we included the national office and three branches in our database. As well as trying to get a 
mix of groups from the different social service provision fields, we considered geographic spread important 
and looked to ensure our database included social service providers from around New Zealand, so those from 
rural and regional communities, and cities. 
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Table 1: Distribution of paid staff and volunteers in New Zealand’s non-profit social service sector 
by field of provision, 2004. 
Field of provision 
Distribution by 
field as a 
proportion of all 
non-profits* 
Distribution by 
field as a 
proportion of 
social service 
sector only 
Education and 
research 
19% 27% 
Health 14% 20% 
Social services 30% 42% 
Development and 
housing 
4% 6% 
Civic and Advocacy 2% 3% 
International 
activities 
1% 1% 
Philanthropy 1% 1% 
All others 29% 0% 
Total 100 100 
* From The New Zealand non-profit sector in comparative 
perspective (p.16) J. Sanders, M. O‟Brien, M. Tennant, S.W. 
Sokolowski & L. M. Salamon, 2008. Wellington: Office the 
Community and Voluntary Sector. 
To assist in building a database which reflected the diversity of organisations, regional representation, and 
the type of organising structure, the research team worked with two peak bodies – the New Zealand Council 
of Social Services (NZCOSS) and the New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare Organisations 
(NZFVWO). NZCOSS describes itself as a “...national umbrella organisation for local Councils of Social 
Services and other social service networks throughout Aotearoa New Zealand” (NZCOSS, 2011). This 
organisation includes at least 50 members who perform localised umbrella roles, from which 26 members 
throughout the country were selected to provide a viable sample of community and voluntary social service 
organisations. Each of the members of NZCOSS had a local membership of community and voluntary 
organisations, which made it possible to provide a second cut sample providing a representative diversity of 
organisational functions. The other peak body is the NZFVWO, a network of social service organisations which 
has upwards of 130 members. The members include national and local organisation as well as branches of 
national bodies. The organisation provides email and online discussion groups and various publications which 
allow members to maintain contact, provide information, and help with submissions to government (NZFVWO, 
2011). 
Both NZCOSS and NZFVWO gave detailed advice on the content, means, and times of distribution (it was 
important to avoid audit and submission times), as well as providing advice on local umbrella organisations 
which were facilitating distribution in large urban areas. Both of these organisations put us in contact with 
various key organisers, which was invaluable. 
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We also included in the database six Christian organisations which make up the New Zealand Christian 
Council of Social Services (NZCCSS) (the Anglican Care Network, Baptists, Catholic and Presbyterian social 
services and Methodists which, according to NZCCSS, has „500 service delivery sites‟ within New Zealand). As 
with the other regional bodies surveyed, both the head office and three branches were chosen in order to 
cover rural communities, provincial centres, and major cities. We approached NZCCSS to distribute the survey 
through their networks, or provide access to their databases. The Executive Officer insisted on distributing the 
questionnaire through the email network of the NZCCSS. This effort proved to be problematic and will be 
discussed later. 
Once the initial database was developed through these channels, we took steps to ensure the broadest reach 
possible for our mail-out database and used local community directories: web directories; and searches of the 
white pages to fill any gaps that appeared. In particular we were concerned that, by choosing to work 
through „conventional‟ social service peak bodies, there may have been an absence of feminist groups who 
provided social services and advocacy – such as women‟s centres. We also felt the database needed to 
ensure gay and lesbian groups were represented as well as youth organisations and „right-wing‟ lobbies. 
While every effort was made in this survey to recognise the diversity, numbers, and geographical dispersion 
within the sector, time and financial constraints meant this project could not do justice to proportionality in each 
variable. The most significant gap in this respect is the absence of iwi organisations. The research team felt 
that this part of the sector would be best researched by Maori researchers, and hope to connect at a future 
date with someone who can look into this part of the community and voluntary sector. While no specific focus 
was given to iwi social service providers, there are responses from iwi providers. 
2.1  The Survey  
Through two mail-outs in August and October 2009, 604 hardcopies of the survey were sent to community 
and voluntary sector organisations around New Zealand, and a further 82 organisations were contacted via 
email by the research team and asked to participate in completing an e-copy of the survey. The final mail-out 
database covered organisations from each of the fields of provision from around New Zealand and a range 
of group sizes. 
One disparity which became evident was the low number of groups from the education and research field 
included in our mail-out database. The difference between the proportion of education providers in the Johns 
Hopkins study and our own is probably due to the place that kindergartens occupy. Kindergartens were 
included in the Johns Hopkins study but we have left kindergartens out of our sample because of their close 
relationship to the state. 
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Table 2: Regional location of community and voluntary sector groups in the mail-out database by 
field of provision, 2009. 
 
 
Field of provision 
 
Total 
Education 
and 
Research 
Health 
Social 
Services 
Housing 
Civic and 
Advocacy 
Aid/ 
Philanthropic 
Auckland  182  11 38 90 3 40  -  
Bay of Plenty  17  -  3 10  -  4  -  
Canterbury 113 3 18 73 4 14 1 
Central Plateau 7  -  1 5  -  1  -  
Coromandel 5  -   -  2  -  3  -  
East Coast 8  -  3 3  -  2  -  
Hawkes Bay 11  -  1 6 1 3  -  
Nelson 11  -  2 6 1 2  -  
Northland 13 1 2 7  -  3  -  
Otago 100 4 31 48 1 12 4 
Southland 18  -  3 10  -  5  -  
Taranaki 10  -  2 6  -  2  -  
Waikato 28 2 5 10  -  11  -  
Wairarapa 13  -  4 7  -  2 - 
Wanganui 5  -   -  5  -   -   -  
Wellington 137 9 23 64 3 37 1  
West Coast 5  -  1 4  -   -   -  
Total 683 30 137 356 13 142 6 
Percentage 100   4.4 20.1 52.1 1.9 20.8 0.9 
 
It was decided to primarily use a hard copy of the survey rather than web-based survey tools, to allow for 
more open and spontaneous comments by the participants. The importance of using paper surveys became 
clear when responses were received as many participants added categories, altered the scales we had 
provided, and wrote comments in the margins explaining their choices. This is more problematic in terms of 
coding than an on-line survey instrument which locks participants in to set answers. Sending out hard copies of 
the survey allowed a more genuine voice to come through. We felt very happy that the community and 
voluntary sector were prepared to challenge our assumptions as set out in the survey, while simultaneously 
demonstrating their engagement with the whole concept of democratic participation. 
As was noted earlier, the research team worked with NZCOSS and NZFVWO organisations in order to 
develop the original mail-out database, and it is significant to note the numbers of organisations contacted 
who have affiliations with NZCOSS or NZFVWO (see Table 3). What is important is that both NZCOSS and 
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NZFVWO members cover a broad range of community and voluntary sector groups. For example, Hutt Coss 
(the first organisation listed in Table 3) includes 20 social services organisations, three health organisations, six 
civic and advocacy organisations, and one development and housing organisation. 
 
Table 3: Number of community and voluntary sector organisations in mail-out data base who were 
known to be part of NZCOSS or NZFVWO, 2009. 
Umbrella organisation 
Number of groups surveyed 
associated with each 
umbrella organisations 
Hutt Coss Member 31 
NSCSS (Northshore COSS) 34 
NZFVWO member 34 
NZCOSS 47 
Waitakere COSS 81 
Dunedin COSS 82 
Christchurch COSS 88 
Other groups 289 
Total 686 
 
An advantage of establishing contact with these two peak organisations was the warning we were given by 
both about survey overload. Many community and voluntary sector organisations are subject to regular 
surveys, particularly those associated with NZCOSS as they survey members monthly. This overload meant 
that follow-up contact and encouragement were absolutely necessary. Follow-ups were done by phone and 
email, and occasionally via prompts included in the newsletters of the two umbrella organisations. Once 
personal contact had been made with an organisation, and particularly with the person who might complete 
the survey, it was much more likely that it would be returned. However, these types of contact were slightly 
problematic in that, while explaining the project and survey, it was all too easy to engage in conversation 
about issues that would influence part of their response. The overwhelming impression one got from these 
exchanges was that each of the organisations were totally committed even in the face of pressures of time, 
money, and personnel. 
As noted earlier, a web-based approach was trialled using the NZCCSS network, but this was almost a total 
failure, and attempts to shift to a hard copy distribution failed. Using an email alert distributed to around 600 
subscribers of the NZCCS e-newsletter system, we received responses from only three organisations. However, 
realising this would leave a gap in terms of the provision of social services by Christian churches – a major 
player in the community and voluntary sector in New Zealand – we sought to contact individual organisations, 
just as we had done for all other groups. 
The purposeful sampling resulted in distribution of the survey instrument to a geographical spread and broad 
range of social and human service organisations (see Table 2). While it is impossible to control responses from 
organisations – as can be seen in Table 4 – a spread of different community and voluntary sector 
organisations responded to our survey. The disproportionate number of responses from „advocacy groups‟, is 
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probably due to the fact that we worked with NZCOSS in many regions in order to find potential 
participants. Part of the remit of NZCOSS groups is to participate in public debate. 
 
Table 4: Survey respondents by field of provision, 2009. 
Field of provision 
Total number of 
respondents per 
field of provision 
Percentage of 
total respondents 
Distribution of 
paid staff in 
social service 
nonprofits by 
field, 2004 (%)*  
Advocacy 37 24.2 2.9 
Education 7 4.6 27.5 
Health 21 13.7 20.3 
Housing 1 0.7 5.8 
International activities 1 0.7 1.0 
Philanthropic 1 0.7 1.0 
Social service 84 54.9 43.5 
No categorisation 1 0.7 0.0 
Total 153 100   
* Adapted from The New Zealand non-profit sector in comparative perspective (p.16) J. Sanders, M. O‟Brien, M. 
Tennant, S.W. Sokolowski & L. M. Salamon, 2008. Wellington: Office the Community and Voluntary Sector. 
The surveys were coded into Excel9 for analysis using a range of techniques, including simple frequency 
tables, pivot tables, and cross tabulations. All comments on the returned survey forms (whether written in 
comment boxes, beside categories we had given, or in separate notes) were entered into Excel and sorted 
according to common themes. In all, 595 participant statements on the completed surveys have been 
analysed. Of these statements 494 were comments providing evidence and examples of the way in which 
democratic debate was either hindered or aided; the other 101 comments coded were often explanations for 
why categories in the survey questions had been modified. These written comments which explored the 
engagement in democratic processes ranged from just a few words, such as “[n]o significant change 
observed” to whole paragraphs. For example one respondent noted: 
Role of NGOs as service provider is different from role of NGOs as voice of civil society 
(often gets muddled). NGOs in NZ are not well skilled in this area. They do not 
generally (there are expectations of course) understand political process or the 
mechanism of our parliamentary system or how things could be influenced to change 
related to this, and question 21. There is a difference between government pressuring 
NGOs to bring their messages into line with government policy (which is unacceptable) 
and governments saying that NGOs cannot use government contract money to lobby for 
                                               
9 We have chosen to use Excel because the programme is widely available, and we hope the data set will be of use to the organisations we 
surveyed – in particular the peak bodies. We were reluctant to use expensive social science packages which would then limit access to the 
data and analysis methods. We are keen for the community and voluntary sector organisations (who so generously gave their time for this 
research) to be able to fully utilise the range of questions and responses given. If any participants would like to have a copy of the results, 
please email: sandra.grey@vuw.ac.nz 
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policy change. If contracts were to allow or encourage the government would be open to 
criticism by the opposition parties. the only solution to this would be for government to 
provide 'grants' to NGOs to foster community voice – the government (last one and this 
one) hasn't really figured out the role of NGOs in strengthening community and are 
therefore inclined to be risk adverse and squash NGO voice. 
At times the comments were so prolific they formed the primary basis of our analysis. For example, in the two 
questions regarding the attitudes of the Labour-led and National-led Government‟s towards debate, 80 of 
the 153 respondents wrote explanatory notes. In other cases, written comments by our respondents seemed at 
odds with the quantitative data, and required the research team to consider the context for the comments and 
the survey response. In all cases, the comments made by the community and voluntary sector organisations 
showed a desire to engage in debate about their participation in, and successive governments‟ attitudes to, 
democratic debate. 
The next section moves to present the survey results which have been aggregated in a way as to ensure 
anonymity of the groups involved. Anonymity is a major issue and will be discussed in section three with 
regard to what it implies about the availability of political opportunities for the community and voluntary 
sector to speak out against the government. 
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3 RESULTS 
3.1  The community and voluntary sector‟s views of democracy  
This section will turn first to the overarching question of the research – is democracy, as measured by the 
ability of civil society organisations to have a voice in political debate between elections, flourishing or 
languishing in New Zealand? 
In order to understand the relationship between the community and voluntary sector and „democracy‟ we 
asked our respondents what they thought of the government‟s attitudes to public debate. Through two 
questions in the survey, respondents were asked to respond using a scale from 1-5 but were also given 
adequate space to provide examples, critiques, explanations, and open comments about democracy in New 
Zealand. We did not begin by imposing any particular understanding of democracy on the study, instead 
letting the community and voluntary sector respondents define the concept in terms of their experiences. Later 
in the survey we also asked respondents for further analysis of the Labour-led Government‟s attitudes to 
democracy by eliciting information on whether respondents felt their organisation could critique, dissent, and 
debate government decisions. We also sought views on their experience of consultation, and pressure for 
compliance by the state. This elaboration was targeted at the Labour-led Governments (1999-2008) as we 
felt insufficient time had passed under the National-led Government at the time of surveying to permit full 
analysis of these areas. 
Overall the survey results do not show a flourishing of democratic debate involving community organisations, 
regardless of who was in government. 
 
Figure 1: Community and voluntary sector organisation’s views on the attitudes of Labour and 
National governments to public debate, 1999 to 2009. 
 
 
While we asked our participants to indicate their perceptions on a scale of 1 to 5, the results should be read 
in three groupings – debate being silenced; tolerated; and, encouraged. Firstly, a large number of responses 
asserted that debate is tolerated (73 under Labour; 60 under National). This led to comments such as: 
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[Under Labour] None of our members have been arrested! 10 
[Under Labour] It‟s more a case of lack of evidence for either the silencing or encouraging 
of debate. 
[Under Labour] No real evidence to show encouraged or discouraged.  
[Under Labour] There was not a great fear that speaking out or raising issues for debate 
would be “punished” by, for example, loss of contracts. However, there was not a total 
encouragement of debate either, e.g. all the fuss about “advocacy” in 2005.  
The comments provided are hardly an affirmation of a flourishing democracy, and our respondents are not 
alone in expressing the view that public debate is merely tolerated in New Zealand (and in many cases 
absent from view). In 2009, at a public meeting in Wellington, the issue of freedom of expression was 
discussed by a panel of leading authors‟ and the Chief Censor. The panel conveyed a similar sentiment to that 
expressed in the survey responses: it‟s not that there is repression or censorship in New Zealand, but rather a 
sense of unease, a concern that there is no lively or active debate going on. More recently, Bill English 
(Minister of Finance), in a speech to the Families Commission, alluded to the problem by noting that no one 
had been awarded money by the Minister of Social Welfare from the innovation fund established by the 
National government in 2010: 
I am not sure what it is but there is something about the way government has worked with people that 
has made them less brave than we can know they can be ….nine months later we have given out almost 
nothing for while people talk about how they might change they are reluctant for reasons we all 
understand to make change in how they do things themselves. It‟s all about the government should 
change, well the government is changing…..We are willing to be challenged but we are not being 
challenged enough. We are not getting enough people kicking the door down saying you can do this 
really differently and here‟s how I am going to contribute, and here‟s how you can contribute. (English, 
2011) 
3.2  Debate is silenced  
More concerning than the predominance of community and voluntary sector organisations who felt that debate 
in New Zealand has been merely tolerated over the last decade, was the number of respondents who thought 
debate had been „silenced‟ and „actively silenced‟ under both Labour-led and National-led Governments (see 
Figure 1). We have grouped together all responses to the question of whether debate is silenced (whether 
they are for the period from 1999 to 2008, or 2008 onward). The result is that 18 of the responses (5.9%) 
signaled that debate has been actively silenced by successive governments and 24.5% of responses indicated 
debate was „silenced‟, if not actively (20 respondents said this of Labour-led governments between 1999 and 
2008; and 55 felt this was true of the current National-led government). 
When respondents were asked to give examples or evidence of the „silencing‟ of debate in New Zealand, 
they referred directly to a range of „problems‟: the government‟s attitude and the resultant policy; 
government‟s ignoring referendums; the behaviour of elected and non-elected government actors; the 
bureaucratic process in respective forums; and, issues with funding (including threats of loss of funding). These 
were all seen to be responsible for the silencing of debate on the part of both Labour-led and National-led 
coalitions: 
                                               
10 We have noted beside each quote, in each case possible, the government in power for which the quote relates. In some cases, quotes 
were not specified to a particular government or time period. While at times there are no significant differences in the responses to the 
period under the Labour-led coalition and then under the National-led coalition governments, some differences do appear. This makes it 
important to illustrate which government comments and answers relate to. 
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[Under Labour] Dictatorial attitudes filtering down through government. 
[Under Labour] National referendums appear to be given no weight by either party: ECAN 
– Household fire ban's. No debate here really. Most national level policy is seen as 
dictatorial now. 
[Under Labour] Governments sensitive to debate in our area . . . and not anxious to receive 
critical debate. 
[Under National] The current Minister is not keen to engage with stakeholders and does not 
readily meet or debate. 
[Under National] Minister not willing to receive dissenters.  
[Under National] Not only actively silenced – there doesn't actually seem to be any 
opportunity for debate at all!  
[Under National] Sees that things are being "done to us" without any opportunity for 
consultation – hence sense of disempowerment, loss of morale etc.  
Written responses focusing on why debate was „silenced‟ under Labour-led coalitions frequently asserted that 
the cause of this „silencing‟ was an absence of knowledge about, and lack of, respect for those working in the 
community and voluntary sector:  
[Under Labour] Our experience from about 2006 onwards was that public criticism or 
challenge was discouraged and responses from some senior Government Ministers were 
contemptuous. 
[Under Labour] We made several attempts to establish dialogue there was no respect for 
such. 
[Under Labour] Removal of funding from the Community Sector Taskforce was an obvious 
example – happy to talk more about this whole area!  
This lack of knowledge of, and respect for, the community and voluntary sector on the part of the state was 
recognised by the OCVS in their Briefings to Incoming Ministers (see OCVS 2008, pp.12-16). 
However, a number of other reasons were given for the apparent democratic deficit: 77 respondents felt that 
bureaucratic processes did not support democratic debate; 79 felt they risked a funding loss should they 
dissent against the Government; and, 55 had pressure placed on them to amend their messages so they were 
more agreeable to the Labour-led Government. 
When respondents focused on the 2008 National-led Government‟s attitude to democracy they stated 
debate had been silenced due to the lack of knowledge and appreciation of community and voluntary sector 
organisations in some cases. But survey respondents went further by noting that the National-led Government 
showed distrust, if not a total dismissal, of the sector‟s input. The critiques provided by our respondents 
focused on both elected representatives and public sector employees: 
[Under National] Minister of Social Development is uncommunicative and appears to be ill 
informed about supported employment in spite of an interest in unemployment.  
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[Under National] Debate appears stifled by practiced speechmaking and bullying of 
individuals by Ministers. 
[Under National] People who speak out have been verbally attacked – possibly this has led 
to loss of contract but this is not clear. Government is less transparent about its intentions 
which is a way of restricting debate.  
[Under National] Government has been prepared to engage on issues but are often poorly 
informed as the trust and engagement of officials appear very low.  
[Under National] Bureaucrats seem to know what is best for all, community doesn't count.  
[Under National] Much more centralised decision-making; fewer forums for community and 
beneficiary interaction.  
There were further reasons expressed for why debate is silenced, reasons which pertain to both coalition 
Governments (though largely focused on National) including: the vagaries of threatened and actual budget 
cuts; exclusionary activity; forced prioritisation of a parties‟ political preferences over community needs; and, 
Charities Commission scrutiny. All of these tend to dissuade groups from engaging in debate and critiques 
according to our respondents: 
[Under Labour] Reduced funding for groups perceived as lobby g roups. We now have had 
to prioritise our interests because we don‟t have capacity to deliver on a voluntary basis 
and respond to everything we would like to do.  
[Under Labour] Cuts to funding or certain organisations not funded and not included in 
government workshops/forums/advisory groups. Advice from the sector often ignored.  
[Under National] Funding withdrawn – no communication or consultation has taken place.  
[Under National] NGOs fearing being vocal will lead to funding being cut.  
[Under National] Services are now 'fighting' for survival which leaves little time or energy 
for public debate. 
[Under National] Needed to be careful not to annoy the government too much or we could 
lose our service funding. (This is even more concern for smaller NGOs with a large 
percentage of government funding).  
The Charities Commission has the potential to stifle NGOs from advocating and lobbying.  
The speed of legislative process, as well as disrespect for existing protocol for public input into political and 
policy decisions, were noted as problematic by respondents with respect to the National-led Government. This 
was evident in both pointed complaints and more expansive comments about the place given to citizen 
engagement by the current government: 
[Under National] It is difficult to describe without becoming despondent and emotional. 
Throughout our organisation we are struggling to remain positive as rapidity of changes 
imposed by current government policy, undervalue, undermine and under fund our area of 
expertise and all without negotiation. 
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[Under National] The key change for us between the former and current government has 
been the new government‟s interest in streamlining services – missing the nuance; 
incredibly rapid roll out of change (lots of legislation under urgency) meaning that 
consultation is hampered; and finding out how best to talk to government that is not 
terribly interested in the views of key players in our sector. Again it is the style that is 
most contentious for us –less so the content of individual policy initiatives. 
[Under National] Speed of legislation going through. e.g. ACE cuts, ACC, RMA rushed 
through with no consultation at all. Everything is done under 'urgency'.  
[Under National] Govt has said „this was an election promise‟ (100 day action) so has 
pushed through actions without due consultations very short time frames to respond to 
issues/consultations questionable processes e.g. Horn report (health) – comments go 
directly to the Minister (usually the Ministry is arm‟s length).  
[Under National] Government is riding high on almost bullet-proof popularity ratings, and 
this along with the economic crisis, provides strong mandate for just "getting on with it". 
Lots of legislation under urgency and some policy reversals are now being seen (e.g. 
special funding for children with disabilities). Cancellation of P2P has left some 
organisations high and dry; youth guarantee has major fracture points in it (even Business 
NZ agrees!). We expect to see the impact of the streamlining in public policy chan ges in 
about 12-18 months‟ time as the unintended results of policy have to be ameliorated.  
While there were a variety of positions with regard to government attitudes to public debate, as noted 
earlier, in total 30.4% of the responses to our core question about democratic engagement said debate was 
silenced in New Zealand. This fact, as some community and voluntary sector organisations noted in their 
comments, has been evident in the media over the last decade. There have been vocal government responses 
to individuals who have publicly criticised Ministers and their decisions. For example, Paula Bennett‟s (Minister 
of Social Welfare) „outing‟ of beneficiaries personal information (Trevett, 2009) after they criticised 
government plans to cut back training allowances. Then there was Prime Minister John Key‟s slating of Keisha 
Castle-Hughes for speaking out on political matters: "My advice to Keisha is this: Stick to acting", Key told a 
gathering of 500 business people in Brisbane….smiling dismissively (“Key: Should stick to acting”, 2009). 
Another example was when Lucy Lawless, together with Jim Salinger, were dutifully ignored when they came 
to parliament to present a cheque for $4,781 on behalf of Greenpeace to send John Key (PM) to Denmark 
flying economy class for the Copenhagen climate change talks (Greenpeace, 2009). Senior Citizen‟s Minister 
John Carter criticised Grey Power in their annual meeting for working on an investigation into the state of 
aged care in New Zealand with the Green and Labour parties, saying “[n]eutrality was crucial to the 
organisation‟s influence as the senior community‟s „collective voice‟”. (Greenhill, 2010, n.p.) 
Responses in our survey highlighted that those in the community and voluntary sector were affected by these 
cases (and other similar cases) where the government moved to shut down debate. When asked to provide 
examples or evidence that debate had been silenced, respondents noted the environment generated by 
public censure: 
[Under National] Criticism of the Chief Justice for raising questions regarding the Prison 
System The Minister in charge of Social welfare releasing private information (in breach of 
the Privacy Act and the Cabinet Office Manual) relating to two DPB claimants who 
questioned Government policy. 
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[Under National] Paula Bennet's 'outing' of beneficiary information; John Key slating 
Keisha for speaking out on political matters.  
[Under National] Exposure of people who stand against government opinion. Shutting 
down of Ministry staff information sharing.  
[Under National] Paula Bennett‟s silencing of staff.  
Respondents demonstrated that they knew there was no immunity from government opprobrium for criticism, 
regardless of whether one is outside the state or inside as a civil servant/technocrat. For example, Nick Smith 
(Minister for Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC)) told 5,000 bike owners who were protesting an 
increase in their ACC levies outside parliament, that increases of the levy were inevitable despite 2,750 
submissions (downundervids888, 2009), and Key (Prime Minister) told farmers it‟s only $3000 for their 
emissions tax (“PM tells farmers to accept $3K ETS cost”, 2009). It was not, however, just the National-led 
Government which had taken such actions. In May 2004 Labour PM Helen Clark called the organisations 
involved in the Hikoi over the Foreshore and Seabed legislation “haters and wreckers” (“Helen Clark slams 
hikoi”, 2004). And it was under the Labour coalition that one community and voluntary organisation found 
itself disciplined for inappropriate associations: 
[Under Labour] [Our organisation] developed, with government support, a national Code of 
Ethics [for our organisation] and a [Government Department] refused to pay for the 
printing and publishing or to have the Minister present at the launch  if we left references 
to [an international convention] in the document. The Ministry also required us to remove 
the name of a person who had been involved in the design of the document because [the 
person] was involved in a high profile publ ic protest earlier in the year. 
Cases where organisations felt pressured into staying silent also came up during conversations with research 
participants. During one phone conversation (to encourage a respondent to complete the survey) it was 
revealed that government departments had questioned a community and voluntary sector representative from 
a small rural community about attendance at a meeting being hosted by one former and one current 
opposition Member of Parliament.  
An additional, perhaps unintentional, consequence of the perceived attitude of government to debate is that 
groups try to ensure they are non-confrontational during public consultation processes. For example, a number 
of respondents told us that local government‟s unwritten policy is to only accept those who are non-
confrontational/acceptable in their negotiation with local providers. Groups said they had to consider how 
often they took part in consultations because you were “damned if you don‟t come and damned if you‟re seen 
too much” (Personal communication). Respondents certainly felt there was innuendo from funding providers 
that community and voluntary sector groups should be careful who they talk to and ensure they are not seen 
as being too pushy! 
While there was strong sentiment by nearly a third of our respondents that debate was silenced by successive 
New Zealand governments, other organisations felt that both Labour-led and National-led governments did 
provide space for public debate and dissent. 
3.3  Debate is encouraged 
By again combining responses to the question „is debate encouraged‟ to include responses under both 
National-led and Labour-led periods of government we find 18 responses affirming debate had been 
„actively encouraged‟ in the last decade or so, and another 69 affirming that debate had been „encouraged‟ 
by successive governments (see Figure 1). But these positive responses were accompanied by qualifying 
statements: 
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[Under Labour] Debate often seems to mean allowing people to discuss, but government 
will carry on more or less regardless! Debate usually pointless, but must happen so they 
don't think we agree with them! Also, we try to keep them honest!  
[Under Labour] Debate tends to be encouraged i.e. asked for feedback but substantial 
change is minimal. 
[Under Labour] Debate seemed to be welcomed if it was consistent or aligned with 
Government thinking. 
[Under Labour] Debate was tolerated but not listened to on a number of issues. For 
example the Foreshore and Seabed issue.  
[Under Labour] Risk averse government but they were available and did listen – at least 
until the end of their term. 
[Under National] Debate occurs but it is not fostered – at least to date – on disability 
issues. 
[Under National] Debate was tolerated but concerns ignored for example the Auckland 
Government and Maori representation. 
[Under National] When debate arises it is quickly silenced and ignored. Publication is being 
regarded as false if [National] government oppose debate.  
There were a small number of respondents who gave unqualified support of their assertion that debate was 
encouraged under the Labour-led Governments and provided a range of statements which supported their 
assertions: 
[Under Labour] [Our organisation] has close contact with [Labour] Ministers – this allows 
healthy debate. 
[Labour showed] Willingness to meet–debate. 
[Under Labour] Debate in media on ethical issues.  
[Under Labour] Public and media debate. Presence at debating environment . 
But notably, the positive comments about the National-led coalition did not mention debate: 
[Under National] Key (PM) government, fresh and seems keen to listen to new ideas, not 
wanting to get offside with public so early into term.  
[Under National] There has been a change in attitude in the Ministry this has not yet 
produced any changes in behaviour but at least the attitude is more willing. 
The absence of the concept of debate was found in many of the supporting statements given by our 
respondents. For example, our respondents characterised the relationship with Labour as one dominated by 
„consultation‟, „contact‟, „seek(ing) feedback‟, „express(ing) concerns‟, „freedom of expression‟; and, 
relationships under National as „focused on sharing of information‟. 
The most positive aspects of these sentiments seemed to result from individual on-going relationships with 
Ministers or officials which suggested a preferred status for the organisation: 
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[Under Labour] Ministers in touch and well informed. Regular contact with regional 
organisations. Pro-actively seek feedback and make themselves available to local people.  
[Under Labour] Our organisation was able to meet with Government officials and Ministers 
on a regular basis. 
[Under National] As with the previous government. We have good working relationship 
with some current Ministers because we worked with them while they were in opposition, 
even though the government were not happy about it.  
[Under National] Support and attendance of Ministers concerned to our meetings and 
conferences. 
On balance, the scores given to successive New Zealand governments with regard to attitudes to public 
debate, and the supporting evidence and examples provided by our respondents, shows a constrained 
democratic environment. 
3.4  What constrains democratic debate?  
We will explore a range of reasons given by our respondents as to why debate has been muted, and in some 
cases silenced, over the last decade or more. We begin by looking at whether it is just a matter of which 
political party is in power. As was noted earlier, the survey asked questions of participants which 
differentiated between the actions of the most recent Labour-led and National-led governments. Overall 
respondents felt debate was more tolerated by Labour-led coalitions, but the results are not as clear cut as 
expected. By comparing the responses to questions about political debate under Labour and under National 
established that 46.4% of respondents felt that debate was easier under Labour-led governments; 12.4% 
stated that debate is easier under a National-led government; and 41.2% responded that it did not matter 
which party is in government there is no difference in attitudes to public debate (see Table 5)11. This finding 
challenges the international literature which asserts that left-leaning groups, groups representing the poor, 
dispossessed, and underclass, will be much better off under left-wing governments (Costain, 1992; Jenkins, 
1985; Jenkins, Jacobs & Agnone 2003; Della Porta & Diani 2006), as clearly some NGOs in New Zealand 
feel democratic debate is no more hampered under National or even more actively encouraged.. 
The large number of respondents who felt there was no difference between the attitudes of Labour and 
National with regard to democratic debate, indicates that respondents are political realists. Community and 
voluntary sector organisations have a very clear understanding about the possibility of genuine debate under 
the two main political parties and their respective leadership: 
[Under Labour] PM [Helen Clark] statements in media often played down role of NGOs, she 
had made her mind made up on issues already! 
[Under National] Similar to the previous prime minister, the current one [John Key] is again 
„Minister of Everything‟ and he acts as someone who has a view on all issues already 
highly formed. 
  
                                               
11 The first published copy of this report contained a data coding error in Table 5. This coding error has been fixed and while 
there is a shift in the balance of the overall percentages this does not change our analysis that party is only one factor 
impacting upon democratic debate. 
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Table 5: Perceptions of changes in attitudes to debate between the 1999-2008 Labour-led 
Government to the 2008 National-led Government. 
Community and voluntary sector 
organisations by field of 
provision 
Negative  
change 
No change 
Positive  
change 
Advocacy 16 16 5 
Education 2 5  - 
Health 11 8 2 
Housing  -  - 1 
International activities  - 1  - 
Philanthropic 1  -  - 
Social Service 41 33 10 
No categorisation  -  - 1 
Total (%) 71 
(46.4) 
63 
(41.2) 
19 
(12.4) 
 
So if the political party in power does not fully provide the answers as to why democratic debate has been 
stifled in New Zealand, what other the reasons given by survey respondents? 
Early in the research process and in conversations with key informants, we thought larger organisations might 
be more immune from censure and find it easier to engage in democratic debate. But using expenditure as a 
proxy for size, there is no significant evidence that group size had an impact on whether groups felt Labour or 
National were more accepting of public debate and dissent. Neither did any of the results show that the field 
of provision from which an organisation came affected their perceptions of the possibilities for democratic 
engagement. 
What our respondents did provide evidence for was that the overall environment being created by the state 
and the current funding „regime‟ were constraining their engagement in political debate. Encompassed in this 
environment is the most often noted constraint on democratic debate, fear about „biting the hand that feeds‟. 
Most community and voluntary sector organisations are reliant on government funding for their survival. While 
there is a high degree of variability in funding arrangements for community and voluntary sector 
organisations, as was noted in the NZFVWO survey in 1991 (Malcolm, Rivers & Smyth, 1993, pp.129-130), 
two possible forms of funding from the state are grants and contracts. These two forms dominated responses 
to questions about organisational resources. With regard to our respondents, 43 organisations received more 
than 50% of their funding from government contracts. Of those who received government grants, 10 
organisations relied on grants for more than 50% of their funding. This reliance on state funding makes 
organisations reluctant about critiquing the actions of the state. In all, 79 respondents (51.6%) stated that 
organisations risked funding by dissenting. 
We asked respondents to comment on any formal restrictions their organisation may have faced regarding 
the making of public comment, in particular, asking if their funding arrangements affected their capacity to 
make comment on government policy. Certainly there has been concern internationally about the negative 
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impact on democratic debate of gag clauses in government contracts (Sawer, 2013).12 In all, 23 of the 153 
respondents to our survey noted that their government funding agreements stated explicitly that they must not 
make public comment on government policies and action (see Table 6). 
Table 6: Does your funding agreement with the government restrict your organisation’s capacity 
to make public comment on government policy and research? 
 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage 
Yes 23 15.0 
No 85 55.6 
Yes and No 2 1.3 
Did not answer 43 28.1 
Total 153 100 
 
The written responses to our survey presented three possibilities with regards to restrictions imposed by taking 
state funding: total realisation of the costs of even being associated with government; rationalisation of why it 
was important to be careful about public comments if funding came from government; all the way to fear of 
making criticisms of the government in public. The latter was so real for the community and voluntary sector 
organisations contacted that despite our guarantees of anonymity, a very large social service provider 
explicitly and repeatedly noted on their survey forms that we had to keep their identity and comments 
confidential/anonymous. We wonder how many groups decided not to complete our survey due to this fear 
and so were silenced from even participating in this conversation about New Zealand democracy.The 
responses of the community and voluntary sector reflected the controlling effect of the 
funder/purchaser/provider split. As Shaw (1999, p.197) noted, this split “...greatly increased the use of 
contractualist devices as a means of regulating relationships between purchaser and provider organisations”. 
This controlling effect was confirmed in a 2004 survey looking at the relationship between the MoH and 
community and voluntary sector organisations where one community and voluntary sector organisation said 
their greatest concern was: “Fear of speaking out induced by contract behaviours and the advocacy/lobbying 
issues” (Health and Disability Sector NGO Working Group 2005a, p.16). The following statements represent 
a sample from our survey respondents about whether contracts prohibit public comment: 
Does not allow comment. 
In some contracts more explicit about not commenting unless agreed with funder, other 
pressure not to rock the boat is more subtle.  
Funding agreements do require any comment that is made about the agreement itself to 
have been agreed to by both parties and there is a general expectation of no surprises in 
relation to public statements that are critical.  
Have to clear any specific references to the work area with government department first. 
BUT workers ALWAYS have to get anything going into media or the public realm checked 
and approved. 
                                               
12 In 2012 Australia‟s Labour Government legislated to ensure gag clauses could neither be included in the requirements for charitable status 
nor in the contracts for publicly funded not-for-profits (see Sawer, 2013, p.11). 
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Basically not to enter into public debate.  
At times need to keep onside with government funders.  
Even when there were no overt gag clauses in government contracts, respondents rationalised their caution 
about public comment or noted the contractual provisions which point to the power differential between 
provider/funder: 
We do not want to draw attention to ourselves in case we lose our funding.  
We shouldn‟t be seen to be criticising our partner publicly.  
Creating „distrust‟ may jeopardise contract negotiations‟.  
Added to this, another 43 organisations did not respond to this question, as they do not seek or receive 
government funding in the first place. For a number of groups it was an explicit choice: 
Choose not to have government money in order to retain independent voice.  
[Under Labour] We do not receive government/contract funding but do this so we can be 
free to advocate on behalf of the community on health and policy issues.  
[Under Labour] We were offered funding from MoH but turned it down. Felt it would make 
it harder for us to say what needed to be said.  
Fears that public critique and dissent will cost community and voluntary sector organisations access to public 
funding is not a new phenomenon. As was noted earlier, there have been actual cases in which funding has 
been cut due to the involvement of organisations in public debate. This started in earnest with the MoH and 
the Hunn-Brazier report of 2003 when the inclusion of advocacy and lobby clauses in six MoH contracts (anti-
smoking) (MoH, 2003) was deemed to be unacceptable under public service standards and compromised the 
political neutrality of the MoH. Additionally, the decision that charity status is not open to political advocacy 
groups reinforces the perception that groups who speak out against political decisions will find themselves on 
the wrong side of the state. 
Even if funding is not cut in all cases where groups speak publicly against the government, the perception that 
it could be cut is of critical importance to those interested in democracy. As was noted earlier, government 
funding is crucial to many groups in the community and voluntary sector, one only has to note the results in the 
Grant Thornton Not for Profit Sector Survey results in 2009. The Grant Thornton team pointed out that the 
“...most significant issues challenging” the not for profit sector was “...financing activities of the organisation” 
(this had increased as a concern for 56% of organisations in 2007 to 72% in 2009) followed by 
“fundraising”, “the role of the board/governance issues” and “retaining/motivating staff” (2009, p.4). So 
fears about losing funding are likely to lead to modification of actions by the community and voluntary sector 
as a result of “anticipated reactions” from government (Mulgan, 2004, pp.312-314)13 to any public dissent 
they take part in. 
3.5  The sinking lid of funding and rising compliance costs  
Groups also noted that some of the constraint on their ability to participate in public debate was due to the 
problems arising out of the new neo-liberal contract state; the level of government funding available; and, 
                                               
13 Mulgan (2004) specifically used this term to describe what might influence civil servants and ministers in their decision-making, but it is 
totally apt in this situation where we find community and voluntary organisations having to decide how government will react to their position 
and whether costs outweigh benefits. 
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the output demands placed around accepting government funding. We will look at each of these issues in turn 
and explore how our respondents felt this constrained public debate. 
First, our respondents noted that funding was tight for the community and voluntary sector and that financial 
pressure has increased in recent years. Of those surveyed, 54 organisations had lost government funding in 
recent years for a variety of reasons (see Table 7). For the most part, the reasons had been made explicit to 
the community and voluntary sector organisations concerned and included the end of a contract, fiscal 
restraint, policy termination, review implications, or priority change by government.  
 
Table 7: Has your organisation received government funding in the past ten years which it no 
longer receives? 
 
Number of 
organisations 
Percentage 
Yes 54 35.3 
No 87 56.9 
Not applicable 12 7.8 
Total 153 100 
 
Some respondents pointedly drew attention to specific cases where, for instance, loss of government funding 
was due to programmes being terminated or „realigned‟: 
Foundation learning programme (TEC-literacy) disestablished. 
Termination of programme. Loss of 15% estimated. Reasons appear genuine, with 
hindsight. 
Just been notified of the cessation of [a particular] programme. … Reason given targeted 
investment focus for this year, means reduction on last year‟s funding level.  
In other situations the funding cuts were attributed to changes in processes for allocating funds; an overall 
decline in the budget of a government department or agency (including a lack of inflation proofing); due to a 
change in personnel in government departments; or because of broken promises without reasons given: 
50% of income lost in 2005 following change in personnel in MoH and “Grant” (20% of 
income) lost in 2009 following change in government policy.  
2 years ago we stopped [receiving] funding as we changed service delivery type but they 
wouldn‟t change the funding over.  
COGs funding used to cover rent fully and a small amount of overheads now only get 2/3 
rent. 
Lost funding this year, through our umbrella organisation con tract not renewed. But 
regional groups such as ours were promised all funding would be secure and would come 
from local DHB. This is not  going to happen now. Even though we have it in writing from 
the funding manager that we would still be funded as we are  the only consumer run 
organisation for those who suffer a [from a particular condition].  
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[Under National] Had CYF contract ( counseling services) [for nearly two decades] and 
exceeded contract numbers for years. Current government gave us 21% of previous 
contract price and simply said no negotiations.  
Around 2000 onwards funding grants got limited to the 1999 value –devalued by [a] 
inflation percentage each year. Also contracts were frozen at 1999 rates for 8 years.  
As with other studies conducted with the community and voluntary sector, our respondents indicated that at 
best the state fails to recognise the true costs of the sector, or at worst we have a state which chooses to 
deliberately underfund the sector. Research by the NZFVWO (2004, p.12) noted “… government contracts 
for funding do not meet the full cost of the service. Instead, the shortfall is considered to be the community‟s 
contribution to the availability of the service” (NZFVWO, 2004, p.12). In 2005 the Health and Disability 
NGO Working Group catalogued another discrepancy in the contract environment. They warned of “current 
financial pressures for NGOs noting the discrepancy in contract provisions between DHBs for the same services 
which it turned out varied „across regions‟, between the North and South Islands and did not recognise the 
extra funding needed to „recognise rurality‟” (Health and Disability NGO Working Group, 2005b, p.5). 
Another problematic trend for those who assert that the community and voluntary sector requires some 
autonomy from the state was the fact that funding cuts often related to changes in government priorities. 
Responses to our survey demonstrate the on-going tension around who the community and voluntary sector is 
accountable to: are organisations in the sector primarily accountable to their own constituencies and their 
needs, or to whoever is in government? 
The backlash against the “nanny state‟ encouraged by the current government has made it 
more difficult to frame concerns in an acceptable way.  
Told that the criteria for COGs now requires organisations to be “providing front -line 
services” for people in need.  
[Funding cuts] Due to change of priority by government reflected in departmental purchase 
agreements. 
[Funding cuts due to] Realignment of Work and Income priorities in 2007. 
Lack of funding – client group outside the MSD criteria.  
This year the Committee for Community Learning in Aotearoa NZ was disestablished. 
Initiative funding is almost non-existent now and the NGO sector is usually vitally the site  
to address creativity and injustice which needs initiatives funding.  
All of the foregoing explanations speak to the volatile and sometimes covert funding environment which 
clearly demands focus and attention on the part of community and voluntary sector organisations. This was 
evident in the Grant Thornton (2009/10) and Health and Disability NGO Working Group (2007b) surveys. A 
comment from one of our respondents captures an additional community and voluntary sector perspective on 
the outcome of changes: 
Need to guard the independence of the 3rd sector and ensure, through contracting, we are 
not just pseudo-government agencies. 
Pursuant to this point Morris and O‟Brien (1999 in O‟Brien, Sanders & Tennant, 2009, p. 28) had noted that: 
“There is a risk that services become responsive to the requirements of the funder rather than the needs of the 
user or of the community.” Even more likely according to the NZCCSS, the contract places emphasis on the 
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“...funded project at the expense of the organisation” (NZCCSS, 1998, p.22 cited in O‟Brien et al., 2009, 
p.28). Similarly Robinson (1999, p.105) noted the increasing “…. influence of government departments 
providing funding through contracts which can impose the values of the government of the day” and “…. [a]t 
present there is some pressure from funding bodies on voluntary sector agencies to adopt a form meeting 
funder requirements rather than reflecting the agency interest” (Robinson, 1999, pp.112-113). 
The efforts from the community and voluntary sector, however, still seem to be directed towards the needs of 
their constituencies. This confirms Cribb‟s (2005) findings from the in-depth investigation of accountability in 
four community and voluntary sector organisations: 
Twenty-seven out of 34 respondents considered themselves accountable to their organisation‟s clients. 
Staff were the second most important stakeholder to whom accountability was perceived (18 out of 
34 respondents), followed by the government (16 respondents), the organisation‟s governing body 
(14 respondents), and the organisation‟s members. (Cribb, 2005, p.45) 
This is succinctly summarised in an unprejudiced way by a community and voluntary organisation in the final 
comments made to our survey: 
We prefer to think of ourselves as a community organisation rather than define ourselves 
in relation to Government. Our experience is that governments of all persuasions have 
progressively become more receptive to the views of community organisations and make 
efforts to relate in meaningful ways. We see part of our role is to have constructive 
relationships with elected and paid officials in local and central government and to 
participate in the political process where it is relevant to our mission of client‟s issues.  
More than 50 different comments from our respondents gave explanations for the relationship between 
government funding and constrained public debate, with most attributing difficulties in debate to government 
attitudes and processes. Only a few offered a slightly different analysis of the problem and placed onus, in 
one way or another, back on the behaviour of the sector itself: 
More agencies seeking funds from diminishing resources, fragmentation of services in the 
NGO sector (so), we could work more cost effectively together.  
I think on the whole we are lucky in terms of our freedom and access and that NGOs as a 
whole do not avail themselves of this as much as they could.  
NGOs are very ignorant of their potential political “clout” and how to use it collectively to 
fight for change. They have few natural representatives in parliament (virtually only UF, 
Greens and Maori) and they need to act more in unison.  
Expertise sharing across NGOs would free up valuable time required to lobby and become 
involved politically. 
They [NGOs] need to join forces and work together to make change happen. 
The essence of these last comments was expressed in 2001 by Munford and Sanders when they envisioned 
how the sector might respond to the challenges with which they had been confronted, including making the 
funders adhere to contract law to the full:  
It will also include harnessing strength as groups of providers and using this collective strength to exert 
pressure for changes which will both enhance the ability to provide services and to deliver maximum 
benefit to clients, (Munford and Sanders 2001, p.56). 
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Both our respondents and other studies note the way contracting has impacted upon where „accountability‟ lay 
for community and voluntary sector groups, that is there is a concern that “the linkage of government funding 
to government rather than sector goals” (OCVS, 2008, p.13). The tension explicit here had been noted in a 
paper given by the Auditor General‟s office to the 5th Annual Internal Audit Forum in 2006. The major concern 
for community and voluntary sector organisations was the increasing expectations of contracts and the shift to 
“...purchase of services and accountability for „outputs‟” (Pilgrim & Buchanan, 2004, p.5). The tension that was 
acknowledged in this arrangement was between community and voluntary sector organisations‟ need for 
independence (to be accountable to and effective for its community) and at the same time be accountable, 
effective and efficient in terms of the use of „public money‟ from contracts with the government (Pilgrim & 
Buchanan, 2004, p.6). This effectively imposed a dual expectation on the community and voluntary sector. The 
Auditor General in a 2006 report setting out the principles which should guide government funding 
arrangements with community and voluntary sector organisations was in no doubt as to the influence of 
accountability arrangements after the public sector reforms: 
Because of the pressure for accountability, public entities have tended to opt for a control approach 
when managing the risks in their relationship with NGOs. Contracts are seen as the way to achieve this 
control. (New Zealand Audit Office, 2006, p.15) 
But the report also noted that this relationship is represented by an „imbalance of power‟. “To be fair and 
reasonable, the public entity should consider this power imbalance in the way in which it conducts the 
relationship” (New Zealand Audit Office, 2006, p.23). 
An additional perspective is provided by Nowland-Foreman (1997, p.9) who accurately outlined a number of 
under-acknowledged consequences resulting from the changes in the funding regimes as applied to the 
community and voluntary sector: 
 there are increasing administrative or overhead costs for voluntary organisations. 
 there are increasing „transaction‟ costs (for the funding transaction) for both voluntary organisations 
and the funding agencies. 
 there is an increasing emphasis on the initiative coming from funder determined priorities and 
diminution of the importance of the initiative of voluntary organisations (in identification of need, 
development of service or programme options and even in operational arrangements). 
 there is an increase in the risks to which the voluntary organisations are exposed (a resulting decrease 
in funding agency exposure (see also Harrison 2010, p.15)14 and 
 there are increasing expectations on, and requirements for, voluntary organisations to behave 
competitively. 
Given the findings of these reports match the analysis of our respondents, it is clear that the sector itself has 
the capacity and awareness to analyse the problems and tensions created by the neo-liberal contract state 
and show that none of these tensions have abated in the last decade. 
3.6  Surviving the constraints of a neo-liberal contract environment  
For some of our respondents, rationalisation of the community and voluntary sector is one way forward in the 
new contractual environment, but how likely is this „rationalisation‟? The 2009 survey by accounting firm Grant 
Thornton asked organisations about their preference for either consolidation or merger with like organisations 
(Grant Thornton, 2009, p.7). The majority response was „no‟ they would not prefer to merge with other 
organisations (53%), but 48% of the community and voluntary sector organisations were equally split 
                                               
14
According to Harrison (2010, p.15): “NGO accountability is seen as critical to limiting government risk, while at the same time, government 
seeks to get more frontline effectiveness through the transfer or concentration of resources at the frontline”. 
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between „maybe‟ and „yes‟. If it was to occur, according to the Grant Thornton survey (2009, p.7), then it 
would be most popular if it concerned „core business‟ (63% of respondents). 
What our survey respondents indicated was more likely to be happening was that rationalisation and 
coordination was being structured as an imperative by the funder (the government). In both Australia and 
New Zealand a rise in contracting has led to „single‟ providers being seen as the favoured approach in the 
community and voluntary sector. As part of the on-going restructuring of service provision by the community 
and voluntary sector, the New Zealand government has in the last few years set up preferred providers, as 
well as a number of centralised mechanisms for funding and accountability purposes which reinforce the move 
towards the Australian model of provision by large corporate style voluntary organisations. In fact, before the 
2008 elections, Green Party MP Sue Bradford suggested there were good indications that if the National 
Party became the government it intended using “...Mission Australia, a large corporate style Australian NGO, 
in a public-private style contracting arrangement between the state and the community sector” (Green Party, 
2008). She said: “Mission Australia is a huge business in Australia, feared by smaller NGOs as it gobbles up 
available contract monies and starves smaller NGOs of funds” (Green Party, 2008). What commenced as an 
activity of grass-roots democracy, whereby providers served local needs, has now developed tendencies 
towards monopoly. 
The Johns Hopkins study contributes to this drive for rationalisation, though this was far from its intention, 
because it numerically showed the proliferation of the sector. Likewise, the Charities Commissions‟ role as 
potential gate-keeper/monitor of the sector could contribute to this agenda as does government‟s preference 
to connect with national organisations. This process of rationalisation is perhaps most evident in the National-
led Government‟s move to put in place „high trust‟ contracts with service providers who have long histories of 
sound operation. Trust is a particularly interesting notion here, given Hood‟s (1995) distinction between high 
trust and low trust within the environment of NPM and the comments by our respondents assert that there is 
little trust displayed in the government‟s attitude to the sector. „High trust‟ contracts favour the larger more 
established groups in the community and voluntary sector, seemingly because of their capacity to meet 
demands around economic accountability and efficiency, and not necessarily the capacity to have a greater 
grasp on community needs and change. During the survey process a number of community and voluntary 
organisations expressed concerns informally that these contracts will mean that money will only go to the „big 
six‟ providers, and those who come into three broad categories – „the firm‟ (NZCOSS), „the federation‟ 
(NZFVWO), and „the Christians‟ (NZCOSS). 
Our respondents were mixed in their views about the benefits and likelihood of centralisation and 
rationalisation. There was some fear that rationalisation meant grass-roots debates, initiatives, and 
democratic participation would be stifled. And still others noted that collaboration may be good, but that the 
sector has been organised for at least two decades in a way that encourages competition because of the way 
government funding is allocated.  
In 2007, The Health and Disability NGO Working Group examined the „environmental impacts on innovation 
and collaboration‟ under this funding regime in a survey of 46 community and voluntary sector organisations 
and forum workshops involving 80 community and voluntary sector organisations. The Working Group 
concluded amongst other things that: 
The competitive funding model means that NGOs are competing amongst themselves for limited 
funding, NGOs believe that this means they are therefore less open to sharing good ideas (or 
exposing vulnerabilities that they could use support with) when this could be used against them in a 
future competitive tendering situation. (Health and Disability NGO Working Group, 2007a, p.2) 
Research by the NZFVWO on „Value added by Voluntary Agencies‟ in 2004 noted this same problem: 
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For the voluntary sector, the increased emphasis on competition diminished the opportunities, and 
willingness, among agencies for collaboration within the sector. The focus on funding outputs specified in 
contracts changed the nature of the engagement of voluntary agencies with the Government and with 
their users. (NZFVWO, 2004, p.7) 
3.7  From neo- liberal contracts to „Third Way‟ consultation?  
As was noted earlier, there is an assertion in policy literature that 1999 was a turning point for New Zealand 
politics which saw a shift from free market neo-liberalism to a „New Zealand way‟ (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2006). 
The expectation is that the „Third Way‟ governance model, with its emphasis on partnerships and consultation, 
would improve democracy generally. For the community and voluntary sector the shift to a „Third Way‟ was 
predicted to mean a more inclusive approach to decision-making. It is apparent from some respondents that 
high levels of interaction between state and community organisations did occur during the period of the 
Labour-led Government from 1999 to 2008 (see Table 8). 
Table 8: Estimate how many times your organisation participated in government consultation 
processes between 1999 and 2008. 
How often did you meet government? Total Number 
A few times 60 
At least once or twice a  year 24 
5 to 10 times a year 6 
Every week or more 11 
Often 5 
Unknown 5 
N/A 35 
Not completed 5 
Total 151 
 
The modes of contact with government were explored to see whether „Third Way‟ governments or grass-roots 
organisations were responsible for generating space for democratic engagement. Our respondents initiated 
meetings with political elite (81), were invited to the table by government (80) and, responded to calls for 
submissions put out by the public sector and elected political elite (87). For 54 of our respondents, all three 
modes were listed as being modes of engagement used by them. 
The responses from the 153 community groups involved in the project showed there was no single method of 
consultation (see Table 9). Spaces for speaking to government and public servants varied from written reports 
to face-to-face meetings. 
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Table 9: What forms did government consultation take? 
 
Number of 
respondents 
Meeting with a public servant 93 
Written submission to a Minister or Government MP 92 
Meeting with a Minister 90 
Focus group or 'stakeholder' forums 80 
Written submissions to a select committee 77 
Intersectoral meetings 64 
Oral submission to a select committee 59 
Appearance at a government inquiry 45 
Hui or fono 41 
Intersectoral research forum 38 
No contact 36 
eGovernment initiative/online consultation 29 
Other 5 
 
While the results provide an indication that the community and voluntary sector experienced a relatively open 
and consultative environment under Labour from 1999 to 2008, this does not mean that the state actively 
promoted democratic engagement from civil society. One way in which the state can actively promote 
democratic debate is to ensure groups have the resources needed to participate in state run consultation 
processes. Of the 153 groups surveyed, 100 said they had received no assistance to participate in 
government forums. Of the 53 who received state assistance to participate in consultations run by government: 
17 groups were given assistance with travel (which might include koha, staff and research funding); 21 
received partial costs of travel (which could include koha and research and staff funding); four received some 
costs towards research (which could include staff); five got funding for staff in order to help them attend 
government consultations; and, four received a koha for their involvement in government forums. 
Consultation with the government has clearly been occurring in New Zealand over the last decade, but is it the 
preferred method of getting marginalised voices into democratic debate? Despite multiple ways used to get 
concerns heard, our respondents favoured communications with their own members, meetings with public 
servants, and work through their national organisations over other forms of claims-making (see Table 10). 
  
Fears, constraints, and contracts 
 
 
Page 46 
Table 10: What methods does your organisation ALWAYS or OFTEN use to get your concerns 
heard? 
Ranked Method Percentage 
1 Communication with your members 80.5 
2 Meetings with public servants 59.1 
3 Through national organisations 52.6 
4 Publication of research reports/data 31.8 
5 Submissions to enquiries/select 
committees 
31.8 
6 Letters to Ministers 26.0 
7 Media releases 26.0 
8 Meetings with local/constituency MPs 25.3 
 
These responses on the forms of claims-making used by organisations must be set in the context of what 
groups do not do (see Table 11). Our respondents‟ least preferred methods of getting a message heard were 
organising protests and deputations to parliament. 
Table 11: What methods do your organisation NEVER or RARELY use to get your concerns 
heard? 
Ranked Method Percentage 
1 Organise public protests 74.0 
2 Deputation to Parliament 50.0 
3 Organise public meetings 35.1 
4 Letters to the editor 27.9 
5 Deputation to local government 27.9 
 
What we see in the responses to the survey is an understandable preference for avoiding the high resource 
costs of disruptive tactics and the avoidance of those tactics which may lead to a government backlash or 
withdrawal of funding. This also errs on the side of caution in regard to the Charities Commission‟s activity. 
Both of these reasons are further confirmed when we look at the preference for writing letters to ministers (61 
said sometimes use this method, 32 said often) and meetings with local MPs (70 said sometimes, 32 said 
often), over going to parliament (67 said they never used this method to get their views heard, and 33 said 
this was used only sometimes). 
The importance of the bureaucracy to the community and voluntary sector also stands out in the survey 
responses. Ninety-one respondents said they would often or always use meetings with public servants to get 
their message out, yet only 17 said they would use parliament as the place in which to get their message 
heard. Going to parliament might in fact be left as the preserve of national bodies, with 54 groups saying 
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they often used national organisations to get concerns heard and 27 saying they always went through 
national offices. 
These preferred methods of getting messages heard must be seen in terms of respondents‟ views about their 
organisations main audience. In rank order from most popular to least: 93 of our community and voluntary 
sector respondents said they „often‟ or „always‟ targeted public servants as the audience for their claims-
making; 92 targeted other groups in the community; 76 government ministers; and, 65 turned their attention 
to the general public. The least popular audiences with our respondents were the media, shadow ministers, 
and local government. These appear fairly consistent with the results above and  the noted preference for 
public servants, perhaps for good reason. As one of our respondents noted: 
There are clear indications that political decisions makers rely predominantly on internal 
department advice and regard external input as a gesture of good will. 
While community and voluntary sector organisations are creative in the ways they engage in public debate, 
some respondents were also quite skeptical about state consultation as noted in written comments which further 
support the explanations of why consultation was problematic: 
We are so busy delivering our service, this kind of activity [involvement in decision -
making] although we deem it essential, takes our much needed resources away from 
service delivery. So when we are not listened to, there is a  sense of “why bother‟? 
however we still keep on because we believe in what we are saying. 
[Under Labour] We felt our expertise significantly exceeded that of policy advisors, they 
felt challenged. 
[Under Labour] Government consultation is getting very limited in the way that they feed 
back. Very little true collaboration with the community sector, they take issue [with us] 
and then work with other government agencies only.  
[Under National] More likely to give policy statements prior to effective consultation. 
Again, many respondents stressed the importance of being at the table when it came to consultation but 
pointed out that consultation is often too little; too late; prefigured; ignored; or did not necessarily result in 
political change. They also noted the significant impact of gate-keeping under both National and Labour: 
[Under Labour] Outcomes are decided beforehand. 
[Under Labour] Consultation is usually meetings with pre-set agendas and pre-set 
outcomes. 
[Under Labour] Consultation comes too late in the policy development process.  
[Under National] More likely to give policy statements prior to effective consultation.  
[Under National] Ministers and officials have own agendas to the visits and consultations 
appear often to be a waste of time. Other times advice is taken but to further their own 
purpose and not that of the sector.  
[Under National] Along with other organisations in the community our opposition to policy 
changes and funding changes is not heard, anti-social decisions are done with no public 
consultations. 
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As was noted earlier, the problem is the differential in power between government actors – who often set up 
consultation processes and boundaries for debates – and the community and voluntary sector participants. As 
one of our respondents put it: 
[Under Labour] Formulation of issues, scoping of terms of reference, and accumulation of 
information were largely done out of the public eye; so public debate tended to happen 
within pre-set constraints. However, compared to the new government, the re was a time 
(comparative) leisure in which to formulate responses to proposed new policy directions.  
Expressed from a slightly different position, another noted: 
Insufficient knowledge exists about the economic inputs/outputs and outcomes provided 
by not-for-profits particularly those that are community based. As a result insufficient 
value and recognition is given to the sector, and minimal (minimised) contributions are 
sought on key political/social/economic issues, in processes such as task forces, 
ministerial working groups etc. 
The issue of power and empowerment is not adequately addressed in the current literature on the relationship 
between the state and the community and voluntary sector but rather focuses on championing the importance 
of government consultation processes being formalised. Shaw (1999, p.197) says the following about the 
relationship: “Thus the partnership between public purchasers and non-state providers is essentially a 
principal/agent relationship, rather than a partnership of equals, which in practice tends to mean that the 
former defines what will be provided, when, in what quantities, and at what cost by the latter.” 
Being involved in state run consultation processes seems to bring a mixed bag of results (see Table 12). 
Table 12: Did you feel your involvement in government consultation between 1999 and 2008 was 
(from ‘was productive’ to ‘had no impact’): 
 
Number of 
organisations 
Percentage 
was productive 77 50.3 
was counter-productive 2 1.3 
had no impact 20 13.1 
was productive and counter-
productive 
2 1.3 
was productive and had no 
impact 
12 7.8 
was productive, counter-
productive, and had no impact 
38 24.8 
Total 151 98.6 
 
We also asked our participants to evaluate if consultation led to „success‟ and in what ways. One hundred of 
our respondents described their success as „moderate‟, and 31 described it has „highly successful‟. Consultation 
was most beneficial, according to our respondents, for improving funding for one‟s own organisation; 
knowledge of policy issues; and, open communication. This is followed by public knowledge about one‟s own 
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organisation and policy development. Curiously, for those that were positive about consultation with the 
government, the least productive results of consultation were in terms of increased funding for the sector as a 
whole and the broadening of those involved in consultation. There is a certain utilitarian competitive 
imperative from those who claimed that consultation with government was productive and much less a sense of 
collective struggle on behalf of the community and voluntary sector. The tension is obvious here and harkens 
back to those in the sector that argued for working together, but in a competitive contract environment it is 
possible to see problems for the sector of doing this. 
Given that 54 community and voluntary sector organisations said they saw no results from the consultation 
held, or that consultation both had no impact and was productive at the same time, it is important to look more 
deeply at what organisations felt was behind the unproductive nature of talk. Table 13 sets a number of 
factors which our respondents felt negatively impacted upon consultation. 
Table 13: If you felt your organisation’s involvement in consultation was not productive, which of 
the following did you feel impacted upon the result? 
 
Respondent 
numbers 
Public servants seem unwilling to collaborate 17 
There is a ‘tick box’ approach to consultation 14 
Government agencies focus too heavily on 
compliance requirements 
11 
There is no consistency in the consultative 
approaches used by government agencies 
10 
Little respect is shown for NGO experience 9 
Government agencies dictate the process too 
much 
9 
NGOs suffering from consultation fatigue 8 
Consultation comes too late on the policy 
development process 
5 
 
These results, which indicate limitations to speaking with government agencies, are somewhat problematic 
given that our respondents pinpointed the role of public servants as the most preferred audience for 
messages (see Table 11). Of the remaining constraints, all but the issue of fatigue were noted by our 
respondents written explanations as to why public debate was only tolerated or had been silenced in New 
Zealand. 
Only four groups expanded on why they evaluated consultation as being non-productive. Their responses to 
this line of questioning seem to be more a skepticism than an absolute negativity: 
[Under National] Although good intentions document is a good sign – doubtful this will be 
followed however. 
[Under National] Not really – although we have constantly raised our fear of decreased 
funding and so far the status quo has prevailed.  
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[Under National] Because much of what we contributed to is being unpicked by the new 
government. 
[Under National] Not in the public health/health promotion area.  
When respondents were asked whether their concerns raised in consultation were reflected in current 
government policy, there was an even split between „yes‟ and „no‟ (see Table 14). 
Table 14: Do you see concerns that your organisation raised during this process reflected in 
current government policy? 
 
Respondent 
numbers 
Yes 59 
No 59 
Yes and No 7 
No Response 28 
Total 153 
 
Of those who opted for the affirmative, and felt their organisation‟s concerns were reflected in policy, there 
was a considerable range in the evidence provided. Seven respondents mentioned observed changes in 
contracts or funding; 19 referring to changes to specific policies (particularly in the health area (seven); 15 to 
process and legislative changes; and, two noting that there had been a reduction in compliance requirements. 
In terms of the reception of messages and the target of actions, we see a real emphasis placed on the 
importance of the public service, but it is important to note that not all parts of the public service may be 
equal in terms of the way they responded to the community and voluntary sector engaging in public debate. 
We had sought from participants some indication as to which parts of the public sector were helpful and which 
were not.  
3.8  Helpful and unhelpful Ministries, agencies , and departments 
Interestingly, when respondents were asked which government Ministries were „helpful‟ or „unhelpful‟, the same 
15 Ministries topped the two lists in almost equal numbers. There were four exceptions – MSD, Inland Revenue 
Department (IRD), Department of Corrections, and Treasury. Over twice as many of our respondents saw MSD 
as „helpful‟ (55) as opposed to „unhelpful‟ (20). With regard to the IRD, Department of Corrections and 
Treasury, these state agencies received no „helpful‟ acknowledgements and moderate „unhelpful‟ notices, 
ranging from three to five respondents each. The predominance of MSD in the „helpful‟ category may be due 
to the fact that they are the majority provider of the estimated $1.25 to $3.6 billion provided by the state to 
the voluntary sector (OCVS, 2008, p.7). 
This overall situation is worth comparing with the results of surveys done for the Health and Disability NGO 
Working Group in 2005 and 2007. While comments here will focus on the MoH and DHBs, it has to be noted 
that community and voluntary sector‟s relationships with the other areas of government, despite a small 
sample of respondents (five to 15 community and voluntary sector organisations) was overwhelmingly positive 
(Health and Disability NGO Working Group, 2007b, p.3). With regard to the MoH however, 60% of the 70 
community and voluntary sector organisations in the 2005 report, and 65% of 59 community and voluntary 
sector organisations in the 2007 report, responded that they thought the relationship was „Fair‟ or „Poor‟ 
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(Health and Disability NGO Working Group, 2005a, p.7; Health and Disability NGO Working Group, 
2007b, p.3). The 44 community and voluntary sector organisations that responded in terms of their 
relationships with DHBs in the 2007 report were more evenly split, with 46% in the former category and 54% 
in the latter (Health and Disability NGO Working Group, 2007b, p.3). The survey noted, in general, that 
there had been a deterioration in the relationships since the results of the 2003 and 2004 surveys (Health 
and Disability NGO Working Group, 2007b, pp.3-4). More specifically, the results indicated that the MoH 
and DHB managers and staff did not “demonstrate a commitment to strong respectful relationships” with the 
sector; that the relationships between the sector and Ministry and DHBs were unequal; that DHBs did not 
“...respect the autonomy of the sector and were evenly split between agreeing and disagreeing that the 
Ministry respected the autonomy of the voluntary sector” and finally that the Ministry did not communicate 
“...in an open and timely manner” (Health and Disability NGO Working Group, 2007b, pp.3-4). 
In the Health and Disability NGO Working Group study (2007b, p.2), the main issues community and 
voluntary sector organisations wanted addressed were “increased levels of personal communication”, 
“greater respect for and valuing of NGOs”, “more prompt and useful feedback on accountability reporting” 
and an “increased involvement in policy development and service planning”. (Health and Disability NGO 
Working Group, 2005a, p.9; Health and Disability NGO Working Group, 2007b, p.6). In 2004 there were 
two major concerns, the first as noted above and the second an urgent need for funding for infrastructure, 
administration and up-skilling of staff (Health and Disability NGO Working Group, 2005a, p.9). The 2005 
survey reported that the MoH did not appreciate the reporting efforts by the sector, evidenced by 80% of 
community and voluntary sector organisations either „never‟ or only „sometimes‟ having a meeting with, or 
having issues acknowledged or acted on by the MoH (Health and Disability NGO Working Group, 2005a, 
p.5). 
There is an evident contrast between the two sets of concerns noted above. One clearly shows the NGOs 
attention directed towards the community or their clientele‟s needs (and their ability to service them), and 
another that drives their attention towards the relationship with the state which obviously is the prerequisite of 
the former. This increasingly complex requirement of a dual focus is not a new issue for the sector. Our 
respondents noted: 
The role of NGOs as service provider is different from the role of NGOs as a voice of civil 
society, but they often get muddled.  
There is a difference between government pressuring NGOs to bring their message into 
line with government policy (which is unacceptable) and governments saying that NGOs 
cannot use government contract money to lobby for policy change. If contracts were to 
allow or encourage this, the government would be open to criticism by the opposition 
parties. The only solution to this would be for government to provide „grants‟ to NGOs to 
foster community voice. 
I would like to see more forums and be involved in the consultation process. We have a 
voice. We are at the grass-roots level and know what our community‟s needs are. We save 
the government millions of dollars yet we are not even 50% government funded.  
The complexity of this position, as regards the influence of contracting, parallels the results from the Grant 
Thornton research in 2009 and the suppositions provided by Saville-Smith and Bray (1994). In 2008, Platform 
Charitable Trust commissioned a survey of community and voluntary sector organisations to look at the 
community and voluntary sector-DHB contracting environment. In the report, 20 respondents that provide 
mental health and addiction services for all the 21 DHBs in New Zealand echoed similar sentiments to the 
above: 
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Feedback has highlighted that the present environment stifles service growth, development and 
innovation in the sector. The costs to community organisations tendering for new work are significant. 
Contractual processes are unsatisfactory, with significant delays in contract completions, ambiguities in 
documentation, and cumbersome reporting regimes. This also frustrates community organisations‟ 
abilities to do what they do best. 
The crucial role of DHB funding personnel is highlighted in terms of relationship and contract 
management and service knowledge. There are pockets of excellence characterised by consistent and 
knowledgeable funding and planning managers, but overwhelmingly it is a picture of high turnover, 
lack of experience, and concern that the loss of institutional knowledge about the nature and purpose 
of contracts makes NGOs extremely vulnerable (NGOIT, 2009, p.5). 
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4 CONCLUSION: DEMOCRACY CONSTRAINED 
Voluntary NGOs play a very important role in New Zealand society. We can speak out on 
issues that others may not be able to talk freely about because of their employ ment 
situation. We have expert opinions on a wide variety of issues related to the [name of 
organisation]. Getting unbiased information out to interested parties is very important for 
our society. 
NGOs play a unique and crucial role in New Zealand. Their c ontribution to political 
decision-making in NZ is currently undervalued and under-utilised. They are under 
resourced and therefore undermined. Government need to value them more.  
These statements from two participants in this survey show clearly that the community and voluntary sector 
sees itself as having a major role to play in democratic decision-making. A role in speaking up for the most 
marginalised of our society; in ensuring policy meets the real needs of New Zealanders; and, in ensuring a 
better society. However, they also illustrate what the survey results presented in the previous sections have 
highlighted - that the role of the community and voluntary sector in public debate has not been actively 
welcomed by the state in recent decades. 
As has been noted throughout this report, organisations in the community and voluntary sector are active 
every day; concerned to be involved in both service provision and political debate; and, want to have the 
expertise of the sector treated seriously. Many in the sector feel that their experience, while sufficient to be 
trusted with providing services, is not trusted or sufficiently respected to be accepted as knowledge in political 
decision-making. One respondent expressed the sentiment in the following way: 
NGOs provide opportunities to experiment and to take risks in what is a punitive and 
blaming political culture. We have knowledge and experience that government should 
respect. Not enough attention is paid to anecdotal evidence.  
So why does a democratic deficit exist and what can we do about it? 
First, it important to note none of these concerns are new or unknown to the state. OCVS „Briefings‟ to incoming 
Ministers highlight the constraints and tensions facing the community and voluntary sector. In 2005, Brenda 
Ratcliff, OCVS Director, in a briefing to the incoming Minister expressed almost identical sentiments as the 
above, in terms of the ideal role of community and voluntary sector organisations. While there is no mention 
of „democracy‟ in the document, there is at least an articulation of what the sector should mean for a „vibrant 
civil society‟ (OCVS, 2005, p.8). She maintained that the sector is “an avenue for the expression of diverse 
voices”, providing “networks”, “relationships” and a “dialogue” between the government and the community, 
and between „people and organisations‟ (OCVS, 2005, p.1-3). In addition, they can “develop local solutions 
to local problems”, facilitate an “early warning system” for problems, and are in the best position to 
“innovate” or take “risks” in finding viable solutions (OCVS, 2005, p.1-3). In short, they “can do things that 
governments can‟t do”, and they can often “lead social development” (OCVS, 2005, p.1-3). The ideals 
expressed stop short of suggesting the sector deserves respect or that it has or should have a role in 
democratic debate, but does acknowledge their integral place within society. 
But the briefing also noted several challenges to the sector, largely focusing on accountability, funding, 
managing risk, and more precisely having core funding for „capability development‟. These cumulatively 
meant lack of ability to “access…information and communications technology”, to participate in “multiple 
government-led consultations and policy conversations” and to get “their issues on the government agenda” 
(OCVS, 2005, p.17). 
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The 2008 briefing paper by Alasdair Finnie, the then Director of OCVS, also notes the importance of the 
sector: 
With total revenue exceeding $8 billion, these organisations offer citizens access to public services 
outside the state sector. They also provide a voice for many parts of our society, particularly for those 
who are disadvantaged. (OCVS, 2008, p.ii) 
He goes on to state that the sector wanted the “development of mutually-respectful working relationships with 
government” and a conscious effort by government to understand the sector‟s “culture and values”, “genuine 
and effective consultation and more collaborative approaches to decision making” (OCVS, 2008, pp.12-13). 
There is no question of the importance of the community and voluntary sector organisations, and specifically 
those involved in the area of social services, as “indispensable intermediaries” (Melville & Perkins, 2003, p.1), 
the “…voice for marginalised groups...conveying important information about the needs and preferences of a 
wide range of groups in the community to government that would otherwise remain remote and uninformed” 
(Maddison et al., 2004, p.13). From a sectoral position in New Zealand: 
NGOs provide a locus for local communities, cultural and ethnic groups, indigenous groups such as 
Maori to realise their aspirations to have a say in the direction of the delivery of health and disability 
services. (Harrison, 2010, p.3) 
It is important to note that as NGOs have traditionally been committed to the reduction of inequalities, 
their clients are often those who most need to receive the benefits of additional primary care funding. 
These clients would be most affected by the closure of NGOs. (Health and Disability Sector NGO 
Working Group, 2005b, p.6) 
Having said this, it is clear from this survey that the expectations that ideals of participatory democracy, or -  
in the words of Verspaandonk - a “well-functioning democracy” (2001, p.9 cited in Maddison et al., 2004, 
p.13) are confronted, if not challenged, by the political pragmatism of the community and voluntary sector. 
What is demonstrated in responses from the community and voluntary sector is that it is the very nature of 
their relationship with the state that has contributed to an environment in which debate is discouraged in some 
cases and barely tolerated in others. Only 87 of the 595 written responses given in the returned survey 
affirmed that debate was encouraged by two successive governments – the Labour-led coalitions of 1999-
2008 and the National-led coalition of 2008-2009. Borrowing from the work of Pavlich (1999 cited in 
Young, 2002) and Young (2002) responding to the plight of criminology, we might argue that the world of 
the community and voluntary sector has been also subjected to a „diluting pragmatism‟ which had foregone a 
firm „belief in universal progress‟ (in this case we might insert „democracy‟) only to be replaced by „technical 
efficiency‟ and accountability. In the New Zealand context this dilution was noted by Jan Dowland of Platform 
Charitable Trust in research on the contractual relationship between DHBs and community and voluntary sector 
organisations: 
A disproportionate amount of energy is expended administering a clumsy, highly specified, over 
engineered system diverting precious resource away from the real work. The dictates of the system 
have dominated the discussions between DHBs and NGOs, rather than how to improve the lives of 
people with addiction and mental health issues. (NGOIT, 2009, p.4) 
This transition to contractual relationships, while seemingly undermining democratic debates (or the capacity 
for it to exist), does not undermine the state‟s legitimacy. On the contrary, the state can attack the legitimacy 
of those very agencies (in this case some community and voluntary sector organisations) that support its own 
legitimacy. The state attacks community and voluntary sector organisations by denying their democratic 
function and defining them as illegitimate, unknowing, untrustworthy, or unwieldy. 
Fears, constraints, and contracts 
 
 
Page 55 
This study to a large extent affirms that the trajectory has been to control through contracts, administrative 
requirements, and efficiency demands, but notes that the antecedents of the trend preceded neo-liberalism 
and the current context of the survey. The consequences (unintended or otherwise) have led to the conclusion 
that the emancipatory role of community and voluntary sector organisations as „indispensable intermediaries‟ 
or, the „voice for marginalised groups‟, may have been subverted. This role has been transformed into one 
that is focused almost entirely on the technical and administrative aspects of performance and compliance. 
The question that arises from this is: does it make any difference whether those in power constitute a left or 
right of centre political stance, or is there any difference? In some sense the answer, as already suggested, is 
that there is little difference with the proviso that there is still a hint that debate (or consultation) is tolerated a 
little more when Labour-led Governments are in power than when the National-led Government takes the 
helm. Throughout our research neither the Labour-led or National-led coalition governments of the last decade 
have come out with strong democratic records according to our respondents. 
A number of explanations are possible when considering why survey respondents did not clearly indicate a 
connection between the party in power and the acceptance of public debate. Why is it that we are faced 
with an explanation that says who is government matters, but it is mitigated by other factors? First, is the 
literature which examines the fact that we had a Labour party without ideology (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2006). 
There has in fact been little clear difference between the policies and practices of governments in New 
Zealand since 1984 when both Labour and then National adopted neo-liberalism as their defining position. 
The similarity of the policy and overarching ideological approaches of New Zealand‟s two major political 
parties is evident in responses to this survey. An exemplar can be seen in the responses by one organisation to 
our survey with regard to debate on issues around Maori sovereignty: 
[Under Labour] Debate was tolerated but not listened to on a number of issues. For example the 
Foreshore and Seabed issue. 
[Under National] Debate was tolerated but concerns ignored for example the Auckland 
Government and Maori representation. 
Whether your group is tolerated, and their engagement in debate is welcome, depends not on which political 
party is in power but on whether the debate challenges the very nature of the state and existing elite 
structures. 
The responses to this survey indicate that we have a situation in which democratic debate has been 
rationalised and transformed into one based on an actuarial approach. This is not about an ideological stance 
opposed to community and voluntary sector organisations but it is about „governance‟ and managerialism in 
New Zealand. This can be seen in quotes such as: 
[Under National] Ability still to negotiate within the parameters set by Labour Government – the 
issue re: where the parameters lie are as relevant now as then. 
[Under Labour] We achieved national funding. 
Successful negotiations over contracts, and a capacity to adhere to managerial requirements, seems to pass 
for „debate‟. This position is further confirmed by respondents who noted that one of the major reasons for 
making representations to governments and public servants was to secure funding to provide services. 
From the foregoing it is clear that „political‟ control and influence is not just about the party in government. The 
survey results illustrate that the rules of the neo-liberal contract state are in part to blame for the decline in 
democratic engagement. Within the neo-liberal contract state, New Public Management has permeated both 
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the state and civil society. In particular, the following basic features set out by Gilling (2007, p.2) influence 
whether there is space for engaging in democratic debate: 
 A shift from the use of input controls and bureaucratic procedures and rules to a reliance on 
quantifiable output measures and performance targets 
 The devolution of management control coupled with the development of new reporting, monitoring 
and accountability mechanisms 
 A preference for private ownership, contracting out, and contestability in public sector provision 
 The imitation of certain private sector management practices such as corporate plans, performance 
agreements and mission statements 
 A general preference for monetary incentives rather than non-monetary incentives. 
Hood (1995, p.94) describes it in the following way: 
The basis of NPM lay in reversing the two cardinal doctrines of PPA [progressive public 
administration]; that is, lessening or removing differences between the public and the private sector 
and shifting the emphasis from process accountability towards a greater element of accountability in 
terms of results. Accounting was to be a key element in this new conception of accountability, since it 
reflected high trust in the market and private business methods (no longer to be equated with 
organised crime) and low trust in public servants and professionals (now seen as budget-maximising 
bureaucrats….), whose activities therefore needed to be more closely costed and evaluated by 
accounting techniques. . . . The ideas of NPM were couched in the language of economic rationalism, 
and promoted by a new generation of “econocrats” and “accountocrats” in high public office. 
Many parts of the community, and the community and voluntary sector, seem to have been afflicted by this 
managerialism, pragmatism, and politics without ideology. 
This overall perspective seems to impact on-going government rhetoric about „capacity building‟ „mentoring‟; 
and, „finding leaders for the sector‟. This approach was found in much of what the Charities Commission did. 
The implications in the rhetoric seem to be: Are you a community and voluntary sector organisation that can 
„play the game‟ and engage in „capacity building‟ effective lobbying, with accommodation, consultation, 
conciliation and assimilation, as opposed to confrontation? It does not seem to matter how large or small a 
community voluntary sector organisation is with regards to their ability and willingness to be involved in 
democratic debate.  
An additional factor which is complicating the ability of the community and voluntary sector to perform a full 
democratic function is the tensions created by the sinking lid of funding and the increased number of 
accountability mechanisms foisted on the sector. The reliance on government funding and accountability 
frameworks means organisations are forced into trying to anticipate and negotiate the disjuncture between 
their community‟s needs and what resonates with the government‟s policy plans. Nowland-Foreman noted that 
this undermines “voluntary organisations being regarded as autonomous representatives of the community” 
becoming instead, “convenient conduits for public services” (1997, p.8).  
Two tactical responses are found in survey responses with regard to the difficulties facing community and 
voluntary sector organisations who want to fully participate in social and political debate. The first one is held 
by a minority of respondents and is about the actions of the community and voluntary sector itself: 
They (NGOs) have few natural representatives in parliament (virtually only the United 
Future, the Greens and Maori) and they (NGOs) need to act more in unison to dialogue 
with government. 
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They (some NGOs) seem to feel that bleeding heart stories or guilt trips of the high moral 
ground are the only ways to get heard; we don‟t get alongside and try to get ahead of the 
policy curve, to be leaders in developing the vision for our services, our communities and 
our sector. We are overly focused on the problems, and miss the chance to create 
constructive messages around opportunity.  
This position maintains that the sector needs to be „more strategic and less reactive‟ in the policy development 
process. This position went on to support a whole sector-government relationship through ministers and 
departments shifting from the current contract environment to one that might envision something much more 
akin to the Australian situation where preference is given to large established service providers. Is this an 
activist stance or realist accommodation and who might, in this environment, hold such a stance? Indeed, if one 
agrees with Nowland-Foreman this might have already been the case as early as 1985/86 (1997, p.6), with 
„large national voluntary organisations‟ having access to a large part of the $75 million that went to the 
sector (in 2011 MSD alone contracted services to the sum of $680 million, according to the Minister of Social 
Welfare).15 This pattern was also noted by Crack, Turner and Heenan (2007, p.193) who state: “….bigger 
VSOs (voluntary service organisations), due to their greater public and political visibility and larger initial 
resources, were better positioned to bid for and win government contracts”. If one looks at the responses in 
this survey it is clearly either large organisations or churches that do have the administrative capacity, 
contractual basis, governmental or Ministerial confidence, and assuredness to maintain this stance (see also 
Crack, Turner & Heenan, 2005, p.193). Hence the very system is likely to coerce organisations into 
rationalising. 
Another interpretation is that the democratic deficit seen in New Zealand is just pragmatic politics. Idealist 
visions of the emancipatory kind, notions of egalitarianism, equality or equal rights have been supplanted by 
an acknowledgement of community needs as long as these needs are molded to various governmental 
priorities. 
An alternative response to the constraints placed on engagement in public debate which have been created 
by the neo-liberal contract state was a far more shared stance by many community and voluntary sector 
organisations. This response has been stated before but is worth repeating: 
There was a particular concern with „guarding the third sector‟s independence and 
avoiding becoming „just pseudo-government agencies‟ or being „stifled‟.  
Organisations, once in and of the community, are now prescribed by the system they work within to be social 
service providers of and for the funder. Once seen with an air of tolerance and deference, the functions of the 
sector are now circumscribed by the notions of „public benefit‟ and accountability through „efficient and 
effective use‟ of public resources. 
Questions are raised then by the drive to centralise, rationalise, count, and sanitise. Even in 1995 it is 
interesting to note Renouf‟s impassioned plea for a readjustment of the relationship between the state and the 
voluntary sector. She asked pointedly that the “...relationship be based on mutual respect and empathy with 
each other‟s roles. It must be one of equal partners negotiating „freely‟” (Renouf, 1995, p.12). By the time 
Renouf gets to setting out the requirements of a reasonable relationship with the state however, the requests 
are almost entirely hinged on contractual obligations including “compliance and transaction costs”, 
                                               
15 The variable figures on the sum of government funds that are applied for by NGOs. Sanders et al. (2008, pp.18-19) maintain that 
approximately 25% of NGO funds (total $8.036 million) come from government which they estimate by 2004 had reached $1.97 billion of 
which $759 million came from grants and $1.241 billion from contracts. This of course is considerably larger than the funds noted by 
Nowland-Foreman (1997). This was the figure given by the Hon. Paula Bennett in a speech to the „50 key Thinkers Forum of the Families 
Commission‟, 11 May 2011 (Bennett, 2011). 
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“operational feasibility and costs”, “realistic time frames”, “transparent and open communication”, minimised 
“market manipulation” and “focus on the Government‟s long term welfare goals and not be driven by short-
term agendas” (Renouf, 1995, p.12). The community of needs has disappeared. It is no wonder that we find 
surveys of the sector with summary statements like this: 
Overall, the survey results indicated the need for improved, more equal relationships in particular, 
increased understanding, more clearly defined expectations, and more effective, regular 
communication, including „constructive‟ feedback on reports, and greater involvement in planning and 
consultation. (NGO-Ministry of Health Working Group, 2004, n.p.) 
In 2005 a parallel survey looks at the community and voluntary sector relationships with the MoH in which a 
similar set of concerns are raised. Between 69% and 77% of the 70 organisations that had responded said 
the Ministry either „sometimes‟ or „never‟ consulted in a „timely and open manner‟, „considers… input into new 
policy developments‟ or informs community and voluntary sector organisations about policy decisions that 
would affect them (Health and Disability NGO Working Group 2005a, p.7). These concerns continue to be 
repeated by the community and voluntary sector in our survey, with respondents wanting their expertise to be 
trusted by the political elite. 
Instead of timely consultation, encouragement of democratic debate, and respect for the community and 
voluntary sector, we have a rhetoric exemplified by a speech from the Minister of Finance Bill English to the 
Families Commission‟s „50 Key Thinkers Forum‟16 that essentially redefines democracy. English stated that “the 
relationship between government and civil society is one of shared responsibility” and unless we manifest that 
shared responsibility rather than a “relationship of mutual complaint” then we cannot expect “others” to do 
likewise. If you want influence in this social relationship, he said, “then take responsibility; that‟s the game, 
that‟s how we play it”. He also says “I am not sure what it is but there is something about the way government 
has worked with people that has made them less brave than we know they can be….People talk about how 
they want to change they are reluctant for reasons we all understand to make change in how they do things 
themselves….We do get some coming along saying you can really change things but don't ask me to take too 
much part in it because I would have to go back to my committee and explain to them that the way we do 
things is going to change. So please come and scare us that would really be good”. Sixteen days later the 
Community and Voluntary Sector Minister Tariana Turia announced that $1.5 million (11%) had been cut from 
the $14 million Community Organisations Grants Scheme (COGs) to give to “…four areas of its [the 
government‟s] choosing …supporting [four] community-led development… through an incontestable process” 
(Levy, 2011, p.A5). COGs funding is used by organisations for a variety of costs including the running of 
helplines, rent, and service co-ordinator salaries. This reminds us of Vine Deloria‟s 1970 book We talk, you 
listen: New tribes, new turf about indigenous people demanding to be heard. Now it is the government telling 
the community and voluntary sector the same thing and calling it „shared responsibility‟ and „trust‟, but is it 
democracy? 
We argue that it is time to listen to the voice of the community and voluntary sector and to ensure the 
conditions exist that allow for engagement in public debate. The importance of the voice of the sector to 
political elite was noted by one respondent: 
The role is huge, generally unnoticed or acknowledged with lip service in the last 12 
months and not regarded by agencies like police, CYF as being significant players. The 
ability of NGOs to rally support and effective political changes is something that may 
well become obvious at the next general election, and currently impacts on local 
government. 
                                               
16
On ONE news on 9 February 2011, the Minister said the government could not “afford waffly policy where people sit around talking 
about good intentions” and indicated the Families Commission would come under the microscope. (ONE News, 2011) 
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But the voice of the community and voluntary sector is not just there to ensure democratic stability and 
electoral victory, as this response clearly notes. Our democracy will be much richer, and our policy-making will 
be stronger, if the government trusted social service providers not only to look after New Zealanders but to 
contribute to political decision-making processes. 
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